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Artificial intelligence, the technology that is currently shaping 
our world, relies on the data that each individual supplies. In 2017, 
the Economist magazine asserted that “the world’s most valuable 
resource is no longer oil, but data.” This assertion is supported by 
the current data market, which became a hundred-billion-dollar in-
dustry in the data broker market alone. However, despite its im-
mense value, individuals are not compensated when their data is 
collected, shared, or when that data is used to replace them in the 
job market. Further, companies are legally avoiding taxes on this 
resource, both during its collection and on the profits it creates. 
Prior to the widespread use of AI, society expected their  
private information to be respected. Before the internet boom, com-
panies were willing to pay the public for their information. When 
information was supplied, people expected some form of payment in 
return. Now, payment is unnecessary because our phones automat-
ically give companies all of the data they need to know, and then 
some. Companies have become more reliant on our information and 
are constantly collecting it at higher rates, but no longer pay us be-
cause they no longer need our consent. 
 
*  J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2022; B.E., Biomedical 
Engineering, Macaulay Honors College at City College of New York, 2017. I would like 
to thank Professor Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid for her support in writing this Note, as well as 
for sharing her immense knowledge of emerging technologies. I would also like to extend 
my sincerest gratitude to the IPLJ Editorial Staff, specifically Sara Mazurek, for their 
invaluable comments and guidance. Lastly, thank you to my father, Ira Rubinstein, for his 
constant love and encouragement. 
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Currently, no legal regime provides solutions or safeguards for 
this exploitation. This allows companies to accumulate and share 
mass amounts of personal information, while financially harming 
individuals in the process. Recognizing the importance of the legis-
lature to combat the resulting harms of emerging innovation, this 
Note proposes a unique solution which addresses both the exploita-
tion of our data and corporate tax avoidance: a tax on the data itself. 
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INTRODUCTION 
We are living in the information age. It is an exciting and revo-
lutionary era that has opened up a world of possibilities, as well as 
a world of threats to our privacy. The ability to have information at 
our fingertips has changed how we think, feel, and act, even on lev-
els of which we are unaware.1 But how has this information age be-
come possible? Essentially, because of you. 
Almost every individual, whether they use the internet or not,2 
is contributing to the information age because it is fueled by our 
data. Data about each person is constantly collected, which has led 
to technology that many have become reliant on in their everyday 
lives. Whether they are using GPS, social media, streaming enter-
tainment, or online shopping—data is being collected.3 The value 
that data brings to these companies has created an extreme demand 
for it, which has led to a reliance on artificial intelligence to collect 
and analyze this data. The use of AI has led to a data boom, and an 
astonishing 90% of the world’s data has been created in the last two 
years alone.4 
 
1 See generally Igor Pantic, Online Social Networking and Mental Health, 
CYBERPSYCH., BEHAV., AND SOC. NETWORKING (Oct. 1, 2014), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4183915/ [https://perma.cc/4DYZ-
5W6T] (discussing the effect of social media on depression and mental health); see also 
Erik Huizer, et al., A Brave New World: How the Internet Affects Societies, 
INTERNETSOCIETY (July 25, 2017), https://www.internetsociety.org/resources/doc/2017/a-
brave-new-world-how-the-internet-affects-societies/ [https://perma.cc/7ZGY-A4K9] 
(discussing how the internet affects social norms and our daily lives); see also Iris Hearn, 
How the Internet Has Changed Buying Behavior, IMPACT (Jan. 5, 2020), 
https://www.impactplus.com/blog/how-has-the-internet-changed-buying-behavior 
[https://perma.cc/278B-W2PU] (discussing how the internet can affect our buying habits 
and what marketers pay attention to). 
2 Jessica Baron, Think Your Data is Private Because You’re Not on Social Media? 
Think Again, FORBES (Jan. 23, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jessicabaron/ 
2019/01/23/think-your-data-is-private-because-youre-not-on-social-media-think-again/ 
[https://perma.cc/3ZPT-UCJD]. 
3 See Marina Zlatanovic, Big Data and Us: How Our Lives Are Affected, AITHORITY 
(July 26, 2019), https://aithority.com/guest-authors/big-data-and-us-how-our-lives-are-
affected/ [https://perma.cc/8C84-9RMM]. 
4 Jacquelyn Bulao, How Much Data is Created Every Day in 2020, TECHJURY (Sept. 
10, 2020), https://techjury.net/blog/how-much-data-is-created-every-day/ [https://per 
ma.cc/5HKN-NLG2]. 
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Currently, Google processes over 3.5 billion searches a day,5 and 
it records every one of these searches.6 Google also records every 
YouTube video watched, logs everywhere people go, how they got 
there, and how long they stayed—whether the app is open or not.7 
Google collects information from approximately 85% of websites 
and as many as 94% of Play store apps.8 They are collecting infor-
mation from all of these sources, but it’s not just Google. Most com-
panies follow a similar practice, such that at least 2.5 quintillion 
bytes of data are collected about each person, each day.9 
Whether the data is being used for an altruistic purpose or a ne-
farious purpose, it is still our data. This fact has led to a controversy 
over individual data rights, and if companies should continue to be 
allowed to exploit our privacy. Some propose that individuals 
should have greater data rights,10 and others propose the regulation 
or prohibition of specific data types.11 This Note, as opposed to 
solely focusing on ending data misuse, seeks to allow individuals to 
benefit from the commercial exploitation of data. 
 
5 See id. 
6 Dale Smith, Google Collects a Frightening Amount of Data About You. You Can Find 
and Delete It Now, CNET (June 28, 2020), https://www.cnet.com/how-to/google-collects-
a-frightening-amount-of-data-about-you-you-can-find-and-delete-it-now/ 
[https://perma.cc/5QXP-8WSS]. 
7 See id. 
8 Bennet Cyphers, Google Says It Doesn’t ‘Sell’ Your Data. Here’s How the Company 
Shares, Monetizes, and Exploits It, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Mar. 19, 2020), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/03/google-says-it-doesnt-sell-your-data-heres-how-
company-shares-monetizes-and [https://perma.cc/T33G-DFVU]. 
9 Bulao, supra note 4. A byte is the basic unit of information, used to describe the 
storage capacity of electronic devices. For example, iPhones can have a storage capacity 
of 32 gigabytes (3.2 x 1010 bytes or “GB”). While an individual could take years to fill this 
iPhone’s storage, the amount of data that companies take from just one individual is enough 
to fill over 78 million iPhones in one day. 
10 Cameron F. Kerry & John B. Morris, Jr., Why Data Ownership is the Wrong Approach 
to Protecting Privacy, BROOKINGS INST. (June 26, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/ 
blog/techtank/2019/06/26/why-data-ownership-is-the-wrong-approach-to-protecting-
privacy/ [https://perma.cc/5HGZ-L3BQ]. 
11 See, e.g., Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 
April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal 
Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC, 2016 
O.J. (L 119) 1 (EU) [hereinafter “GDPR”]. See also infra Section I.B.2 for information on 
state, federal, and international privacy approaches. 
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Currently, companies are collecting data and profiting im-
mensely from it, but the people they are taking it from are not being 
compensated for its use. Even further, the companies generating the 
most profit from this data avoid the taxations on that profit.12 Data 
is being treated as a free resource—despite the public wanting com-
pensation when their data is shared13—which has incentivized com-
panies to continue taking the data at an alarming rate.14 
Both corporate data use, as well as trends of corporate tax ex-
penditures, create financial burdens on the average person. This 
Note proposes instituting a specific tax on the amount of data ac-
quired by large companies, creating an increase in tax revenue that 
will benefit, or “pay back,” the public who supplied it. Part I will 
describe how artificial intelligence has made our data valuable, and 
why individuals do not receive direct compensation for its use. Part 
II will discuss the role of individuals as data suppliers, as well as 
negative effects of data practices. This Part will also discuss the so-
cietal harms which stem from current corporate tax avoidance, fol-
lowed by a brief introduction to competing approaches to data 
rights. Part III will propose the tax solution, highlighting both im-
mediate and long-term benefits, as well as the data tax’s potential to 
improve privacy protections. This Note reflects upon the corporate 
mistreatment of data, as well as the changes it has made to society. 
Privacy and data autonomy are no longer expected, and our laws 
must act to reshape our social norms. 
 
I. HOW COMPANIES PROFIT FROM OUR DATA . . . AND WHY WE DON’T 
As of 2017, it was estimated that our data was worth approxi-
mately $1,000 a year per person, and the amount of yearly data taken 
 
12 See generally, Doron Narotzki, Corporate Social Responsibility and Taxation: The 
Next Step of the Evolution, 16 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 167, 168 (2016). 
13 See Kerry & Morris, supra note 10. A 2019 Insights Network survey found that 79% 
of respondents want compensation when their data is shared. Will.i.am, a tech entrepreneur 
and member of the musical group Black Eyed Peas, argues that payment for our data will 
remedy the imbalance between individuals and the large companies using our data. Id. 
14 Jeffrey Ritter & Anna Mayer, Regulating Data as Property: A New Construct for 
Moving Forward, 16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 220, 254 (2018), (describing that 2.5 
quintillion bytes of data were taken from each person daily in 2018, which is expected to 
grow fifty times by 2020). 
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from each person since then has only increased.15 Emerging tech-
nologies have given data immense value, which is not conferred to 
the people who generate it. This Part will examine artificial intelli-
gence’s role in society, as well as how current laws allow private 
information to be harvested and used freely. 
A. The Technology: How Artificial Intelligence Revolutionized 
Data 
Artificial Intelligence (“AI”) has played a vital role in the data 
boom. This technology is utilized constantly to collect and analyze 
data as well as draw valuable conclusions.16 AI allows an unimagi-
nable amount of information to be collected about us daily,17 which 
creates billions in profits yearly.18 This Part will provide a basic de-
scription of the capabilities of AI and how it interacts with infor-
mation. It will then discuss the different types of information ob-
tained for commercial use and why such information is valuable to 
companies. 
1. What is Artificial Intelligence and How Does it Function? 
Technological advances, mainly in artificial intelligence, have 
allowed the collection of our data to become quick, easy, and even 
automatic.19 AI systems are algorithms designed to make independ-
ent decisions, comparable to human intelligence.20 Arthur I. Miller, 
professor and author of The Artist in the Machine: The World of AI 
Powered Creativity, explained that, “artificial neural networks are 
loosely inspired by the way the brain is wired. They are made up of 
layers of artificial neurons, and, like the human brain, require data 
 
15 Saadia Madsbjerg, It’s Time to Tax Companies for Using Our Personal Data, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/14/business/dealbook/taxing-
companies-for-using-our-personal-data.html [https://perma.cc/8HKF-QNDC]. 
16 See Andrew J. McClurg, A Thousand Words Are Worth a Picture: A Privacy Tort 
Response to Consumer Data Profiling, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 63, 70 (2003). 
17 See id. 
18 See Madsbjerg, supra note 15. 
19 Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid, Generating Rembrandt: Artificial Intelligence, Copyright, 
and Accountability in the 3A Era—The Human-Like Authors Are Already Here—A New 
Model, 2017 MICH. ST. L. REV. 659, 673 (2017). 
20     Barclay Ballard, Artificial Intelligence Begins to Show Signs of Human-Like Creativ-
ity, THE NEW ECONOMY, https://www.theneweconomy.com/technology/artificial-intelli-
gence-begins-to-show-signs-of-human-like-creativity [https://perma.cc/773M-5LTG]. 
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in order to respond to what they see and hear.”21 Among other fea-
tures, these technologies are creative, independent, evolving, and 
have the ability to collect data and “learn.”22 Arguably, the  
most important aspect of AI is its ability to collect data because  
data is used to train the system, and therefore influences all of its 
determinations.23 
To understand how AI is trained using data, the technology can 
be compared to a child who is first learning what animals are. A 
child may know that their house pet is a cat, but if that is the only 
cat they have seen, they may see a fluffy dog and also call it a cat. 
As the child sees more cats and dogs, they can easily tell the differ-
ence between the animals. An AI system works the same way but 
requires a greater number of examples to reach the same conclu-
sions.24 As an AI system is trained with more and more pictures of 
cats, it can learn to distinguish them from other animals and identify 
cats in new pictures. The AI can also evolve to distinguish between 
different breeds and ages. Eventually, these AI systems can become 
so sophisticated that they recognize patterns which a human may 
have never realized or expected.25 
AI systems can also use this data to produce new combina-
tions.26 Producing new combinations can be described as making 
analogies, and sometimes making improbable combinations of 
 
21 Id. 
22 See Yanisky-Ravid, supra note 19, at 659. 
23 See id. at 672–73. See also Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid & Sean K. Hallisey, “Equality 
and Privacy by Design”: A New Model of Artificial Intelligence Data Transparency via 
Auditing, Certification, and Safe Harbor Regimes, 46 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 428, 438–43 
(2019). 
24 See Imanol Arrieta-Ibarra et al., Should We Treat Data as Labor? Moving Beyond 
“Free”, 108 AM. ECON. ASSOC. PAPERS & PROC. 38, 40–41 (2018); Yanisky-Ravid & 
Hallisey, supra note 23, at 439. 
25 In relation to the cats, one (fabricated) unexpected result could be that the AI found 
that cats with blue eyes sit differently than other cats, leading scientists to discover they 
have an extra muscle near their tail. For real examples of unexpected results of AI, see Eric 
Limer, The Hilarious (And Terrifying?) Ways Algorithms Have Outsmarted Their 
Creators, POPULAR MECHANICS (Mar. 15, 2018), https://www.popularmechanics.com/ 
technology/robots/a19445627/the-hilarious-and-terrifying-ways-algorithms-have-
outsmarted-their-creators/ [https://perma.cc/G6EL-57XK]. 
26 Arthur Mello, Creativity and Artificial Intelligence, TOWARDS DATA SCI. (May 22, 
2020), https://towardsdatascience.com/creativity-and-artificial-intelligence-
46de4326970c [https://perma.cc/B7HK-B8NU]. 
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familiar ideas.27 The AI systems do not copy already existing works, 
but rather create new and unpredictable works.28 One example is an 
AI that creates puns by understanding what words sound similar.29 
The technology creates a new combination by understanding pat-
terns to create a novel pun, which is more sophisticated than simply 
copying an existing pun or randomly generating words. In the case 
of our cats, that would entail the AI combining different character-
istics of different breeds to create an image of a breed that does not 
yet exist. This principle has similarly been seen in the arts, such  
as creating new works “by Beethoven.”30 To do this, the AI takes  
all of Beethoven’s works and understands the “rules” or patterns that 
make it Beethoven-like. It then uses these rules to make a new  
combination of notes, without copying an existing melody, to pro-
duce works that sound as though they are something Beethoven 
composed.31 
Artificial intelligence not only evolves to make better analyses 
when exposed to data sets but can also independently collect data. 
For example, in order to collect data from webpages, AI can employ 
data scraping tools.32 Data scraping allows all of the information to 
be taken automatically, or “scraped,” from a webpage, including 
pages like social media profiles.33 Further, the latest generations of 
chatbots are now able to proactively request needed data without 
 
27 See id. 
28 Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid & Luis Antonio Velez-Hernandez, Copyrightability of 
Artworks Produced by Creative Robots, Driven by Artificial Intelligence Systems and the 
Concept of Originality: The Formality—Objective Model, 19 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 1, 7 
(2018). 
29 Margaret A. Boden, Creativity and Artificial Intelligence, 103 A.I. 347, 349 
(1998),http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.667.3710&rep=rep1&t
ype=pdf [https://perma.cc/ZS8D-A3ZA]. 
30 Mello, supra note 26. 
31 See id. 
32 Alex Nguyen, The Best Data Collection Tools for Machine Learning, LIONBRIDGE 
(May 25, 2020), https://lionbridge.ai/articles/best-data-collection-tools-for-machine-
learning [https://perma.cc/JY9L-TQSN]. 
33 See HiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 938 F.3d 985, 1005 (9th Cir. 2019), in which 
HiQ scraped LinkedIn profiles, including information unavailable to the public, and then 
sold that information to employers. The court held this was a legal activity. See also EF 
Cultural Travel v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 579 (1st Cir. 2001), in which a travel 
company, Explorica, used “scrapers”—robot tools used to gather and compile information 
from other sites—to take information from EF and use it to improve their own prices. 
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human intervention. The same idea is also applied by AI-driven sur-
veys, which can adapt depending on the type of data needed.34  
AI can also scan through documents to identify relevant informa-
tion and contextual clues without being preprogrammed to do so.35  
This allows the AI to continue to take information and evolve inde-
pendently,36 becoming “smarter” as it continues to collect. 
As AI collects more proper and representative data from people, 
it can use this data to predict human behavior and what humans may 
want.37 AI usually takes all of the information that it can,38 and this 
large-scale collection creates extreme issues in privacy.39 Once 
companies have someone’s data, other companies may access it 
from them, and the data is continuously held and transferred by var-
ious companies and data brokers.40 The use of AI for the mass 
 
34 Andre Smith, Closing the Loop: How AI is Changing Data Collection, DIGITALIST 
MAG. (Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.digitalistmag.com/future-of-work/2019/01/31/closing-
loop-how-ai-is-changing-data-collection-06195955 [https://perma.cc/Q2Z7-QMXE]. 
35 See id. 
36 AI is currently finding ways to evolve independently; this evolution may be compared 
to the theories expressed in Darwin’s theory of evolution, taking inspiration from “the 
survival of the fittest” model. Edd Gent, Artificial Intelligence is Evolving All by Itself, SCI. 
(Apr. 13, 2020, 11:20 AM), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2020/04/artificial-
intelligence-evolving-all-itself [https://perma.cc/W7F3-JLJC]. For example, one 
technology created by researchers at Google simply combines basic mathematical concepts 
to create an AI with almost no human input (they themselves describe it as having 
“effectively zero human input”). See id. The program then creates different possibilities of 
algorithms by randomly combining these mathematical problems, and through each cycle 
the program can determine which algorithms are the best. See id. The best algorithms are 
kept or slightly improved and the cycles continue, until the AI itself has evolved into the 
best algorithm possible. See id. 
37 Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Big Data for All: Privacy and User Control in the 
Age of Analytics, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 239, 249 (2013) (explaining that the 
most prevalent internet business model is based on the use of targeted ads); see also Data 
Collection, DATAROBOT, https://www.datarobot.com/wiki/data-collection [https://perm 
a.cc/G4L7-D3RP]. 
38 Ron Schmelzer, Automating Data Collection for AI at Morningstar, FORBES (Oct. 1, 
2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/cognitiveworld/2020/10/01/automating-data-collecti 
on-for-ai-at-morningstar [https://perma.cc/9DJF-DTRB]. 
39 See Loiuse Matsakis, The Wired Guide to Your Personal Data (and Who is Using It), 
WIRED (Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.wired.com/story/wired-guide-personal-data-
collection [https://perma.cc/W3LU-237M]. 
40      For example, PayPal disclosed that it shares user data with hundreds of entities around 
the world. See Your Data is Being Shared and Sold…What’s Being Done About It?, 
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collection and analysis of data has been instrumental to making the 
data boom possible.41 
2. Our Data is Constantly Being Taken . . . What is it Used 
For? 
Imagine a typical morning for the average person. What is the 
first thing they do when they wake up? Probably, they check their 
phone.42 What they may not imagine is that this simple act gives 
companies a multitude of data on them. Firstly, from location data 
(that the phone stayed in the same place overnight) and lack of ac-
tivity, there is now data being collected on where that person 
sleeps.43 Over time, this data is used to determine where they live, 
and possibly where their significant other lives.44 Sleep cycles and 
location data can even tell companies if this person is depressed.45 
Simply checking a cell phone can give companies an abundance of 
personal information, and that is only the tip of the iceberg. 
Generally, companies collect four main types of data: (1) per-
sonal, (2) engagement, (3) behavioral, and (4) attitudinal data.46 Per-
sonal data includes age, gender, social security number, sexual ori-
entation, and browser cookies.47 Engagement data tells businesses 
how people interact with their website and apps, while behavioral 
 
KNOWLEDGE AT WHARTON (Oct. 28, 2019), https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/arti-
cle/data-shared-sold-whats-done/ [https://perma.cc/3KAD-S54X]. The data broker indus-
try profits from sharing individual information. See Wlosik, infra note 60. 
41 See id. 
42 A 2016 study found that 61% of respondents check their phone within five minutes 
of waking up, 88% within thirty minutes of waking up, and 96% within an hour of waking 
up. 61% People Check Their Phones Within 5 Minutes After Waking Up: Deloitte, BGR.IN 
(Dec. 29, 2016), https://www.bgr.in/news/61-people-check-their-phones-within-5-
minutes-after-waking-up-deloitte-435501 [https://perma.cc/U6ZT-VXMZ]. 
43 Mytheos Holt, Google Knows Where You Sleep, AM. SPECTATOR (Dec. 19, 2020), 
https://spectator.org/google-knows-where-you-sleep [https://perma.cc/QF8Z-DC7Q]. 
44 See id. 
45 Sohrob Saeb, Your Mobile Phone Knows Where You Go and What You Do—And 
Maybe Even When You’re Feeling Down, THE CONVERSATION (Aug. 3, 2015), 
https://theconversation.com/your-mobile-phone-knows-where-you-go-and-what-you-do-
and-maybe-even-when-youre-feeling-down-45360 [https://perma.cc/P7EX-MNMP]. 
46 Max Freedman, How Businesses Are Collecting Data (And What They’re Doing with 
It), BUS. NEWS DAILY (June 17, 2020), https://www.businessnewsdaily.com/10625-
businesses-collecting-data.html [https://perma.cc/74T9-RHL4]. 
47 See id. 
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data shows purchase history and what products people buy.48 Lastly, 
attitudinal data gives information on their satisfaction and what 
products consumers might be interested in.49 A “robust business 
strategy” will use three methods to collect this data: (1) directly ask-
ing customers, (2) indirectly tracking customers, and (3) collecting 
data that others have already taken from those customers.50 
After the data is taken, it must be analyzed. To do this, compa-
nies usually employ artificial intelligence. The AI technology will 
analyze this information to find patterns and make insights, and the 
technology constantly improves as it obtains more data.51 As dis-
cussed, simple daily habits create massive amounts of data. Using 
the described data categories, a “profile” is built that allows AI to 
predict what someone likes and dislikes, what they are most likely 
to respond to, and anticipates what they want to see.52 This can be 
useful for consumers, but it can also have individual and widespread 
negative effects. 
The recent rise in the spreading of false information, specifically 
through social media, demonstrates just one potentially harmful 
consequence of AI. In one example, Facebook algorithms analyze 
which people are friends, what they watch, and how long they look 
at certain posts. This information is used to tailor feeds to specific 
interests.53 However, if someone or their friends have recently read 
conspiracy theories, they are flagged as people interested in this con-
tent.54 The system will then target them—and those most likely to 
interact with the content—with an increased volume of fake news 
and conspiracies, amplifying the disinformation.55 This is problem-





51 Yanisky-Ravid & Hallisey, supra note 23. 
52 See McClurg, supra note 16, at 71–87, for a discussion and examples of consumer 
profiling. 
53 Antoine Tardif, How Facebook’s AI Spreads Misinformation and Threatens 
Democracy, UNITE.AI (Sept. 30, 2020), https://www.unite.ai/how-facebooks-ai-spreads-
misinformation-and-threatens-democracy [https://perma.cc/YXL2-AQBY]. 
54 See id. 
55 See id. (discussing confirmation bias and Facebook’s ability to tailor individualized 
feeds based on predictions about interaction preferences). 
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MIT study revealed that fake news on Twitter will spread six times 
faster than real news.56 Note that it is not a person who is targeting 
these people’s feeds, but the AI system itself. 
Companies will use these patterns and predictions to make a 
profit by customizing their market strategies and improving cus-
tomer relationships. Consider Netflix, a company that monitors what 
people stream in order to recommend shows they would likely watch 
as well as create new content based on what people are likely to 
enjoy. Netflix is able to use AI’s patterns and predictions to attract 
new customers, as well as retain current customers.57 Companies 
also profit by selling information to third parties.58 This has led to 
the booming data broker industry, which is comprised of companies 
that simply buy and sell compilations of data profiles.59 The data 
broker industry generates $200 billion in yearly revenue and is con-
tinuing to grow.60 It seems that the more data is collected, the greater 
the demand for data becomes.61 To keep up with this demand, data 
must be collected quickly, efficiently, and on large scales, which has 
led to a heavy reliance on artificial intelligence to collect and ana-
lyze this data.62 
AI has revolutionized data by collecting information at previ-
ously unfeasible rates, as well as providing useful and profitable 
analyses of such data. In 2018, it was estimated that each individual 
generated 2.5 quintillion bytes of data each day, (which is enough 
 
56 Peter Dizikes, Study: On Twitter, False News Travels Faster than True Stories, MIT NEWS, 
(Mar. 8, 2018), https://news.mit.edu/2018/study-twitter-false-news-travels-faster-true-
stories-0308 [https://perma.cc/6D5Y-PMCC]. 
57 See Michael Dixon, How Netflix Used Big Data and Analytics to Generate Billions, 
SELERITY (Apr. 5, 2019), https://seleritysas.com/blog/2019/04/05/how-netflix-used-big-
data-and-analytics-to-generate-billions/ [https://perma.cc/MLC8-F6Z6]. 
58 Freedman, supra note 46.  
59 See id. 
60 Michal Wlosik, What Is a Data Broker and How Does It Work?, CLEARCODE (Nov. 
25, 2020), https://clearcode.cc/blog/what-is-data-broker/ [https://perma.cc/W4CL-
WPBN]. 
61 See Cyphers, supra note 8. 
62 See, e.g., The 5 Industries That Rely on Artificial Intelligence, ANALYTICSINSIGHT 
(Feb. 19, 2020), https://www.analyticsinsight.net/significant-5-industries-rely-artificial-
intelligence/ [https://perma.cc/SZA9-YXKQ] (describing industries that rely on artificial 
intelligence and its insights). 
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information to fill over 78 million iPhones),63 and this number is 
expected to increase exponentially by 2021.64 This is an enormous 
amount of data generated daily by each person, by which companies 
are profiting billions of dollars yearly.65 In 2017, when data accu-
mulation was far less prevalent than the present day, it was estimated 
that this data was worth approximately $1,000 per person per year.66 
This demonstrates that our data is extremely valuable not only for 
the training of the AI system itself, but to the companies as a whole. 
B. The Current Legal Landscape 
Data is harvested and shared in mass quantities, which is usually 
legal.67 This section will provide background information of the cur-
rent legal landscape, and how it enables corporate data practices. It 
will begin by detailing property rights, followed by a description of 
exemplary federal, state, and foreign privacy laws. Finally, it will 
move on to generally explain the United States tax system, while 
focusing on corporate tax laws. 
1. Property Laws 
Some form of property law has been present since the nation’s 
creation, and is protected by the Constitution, common law, and 
state law.68 Property rights include the right to possess, the right to 
exclude, and the right to transfer.69 Essentially, these rights give a 
property owner the ability to do what they please with their own 
possessions, as well as stop others from using them. Naturally, these 
 
63 See supra note 9. 
64 Ritter & Mayer, supra note 14, at 254. 
65 Saadia Madsbjerg, It’s Time to Tax Companies for Using Our Personal Data, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/14/business/dealbook/taxing-
companies-for-using-our-personal-data.html [https://perma.cc/KE6E-56N9]. 
66 See id. 
67 Data regulation varies based upon data type, state, and country. See infra Section 
I.B.2.  
68 Roger Pilon, Cato Handbook for Policymakers: Property Rights and the Constitution, 
CATO INST. (2017), https://www.cato.org/cato-handbook-policymakers/cato-handbook-
policy-makers-8th-edition-2017/property-rights-constitution [https://perma.cc/6UQV-
6CX4]. 
69 Lothar Determann, No One Owns Data, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 8–9 (Dec. 2018). 
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rights are limited by the rights of others—a person cannot freely use 
their property if it interferes with another person or their property.70 
Property is defined as anything that is owned by a person or en-
tity.71 Generally, property is separated into three categories: (1) real 
property, (2) personal property, and (3) intellectual property 
(“IP”).72 Real property encompasses land and real estate, while 
physical property is all other tangible objects that aren’t real prop-
erty, such as clothes, cell phones, and cars.73 The third category, in-
tellectual property, refers to intangible property or expressed ideas.74 
IP includes categories such as books, songs, and inventions.75 IP 
rights are governed by specific and distinct intellectual property 
laws: copyrights protect creative works of authorship, trademarks 
protect branding, and patents protect inventions.76 
Certain ideas are owned by no one or everyone and are consid-
ered “public domain.”77 Categories of public domain include facts 
and information, works created by the U.S. Government, and famil-
iar words, phrases, and symbols.78 Works that were previously pro-
tected can also become public domain once the protection lapses.79 
Patent protections expire after twenty years and copyright protec-
tions expire seventy years after the author’s death, at which point 
the work is no longer “owned” by the creator.80 Conversely, trade-
marks do not expire after a set period of time.81 
 
70 Id. at 11. 
71 Property, LAW.COM LEGAL DICTIONARY, 
https://dictionary.law.com/Default.aspx?selected=1645 [https://perma.cc/YCS3-9RNL]. 
72 Determann, supra note 69, at 8. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 8–10. 
75 Id. at 10. 
76 Emily Heaslip, Guide to Understanding Common Law Intellectual Property, U.S. 
CHAMBER OF COM. (Mar. 4, 2020), https://www.uschamber.com/co/start/strategy/ 
common-law-intellectual-property [https://perma.cc/QN49-YRPV]. 
77 Id. 
78 Id.; see also 17 U.S.C. § 105. 
79 Heaslip, supra note 76; see also 17 U.S.C. § 105. 
80 Heaslip, supra note 76. 
81 Id. 
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2. Privacy Laws 
Like property law, privacy law is grounded in the American 
Constitution and Bill of Rights, as well as common law.82 The Con-
stitution does not explicitly mention privacy rights, but the Supreme 
Court combined constitutional rights to create “zones of privacy,” 
or areas of life that are free from intrusion.83 These areas include the 
home, but also include areas we would expect to keep private, such 
as our daily habits or health decisions.84 
As internet use and data sharing became more widespread, the 
public became increasingly concerned with violations of their pri-
vacy. The U.S. government banned several Chinese social media 
apps as a way to protect personal data and has considered banning 
even more, such as TikTok.85 Americans feel that it is not possible 
to go through daily life without being tracked,86 and that they have 
little control over how their data is being used to draw inferences 
about them.87 
Despite these concerns, there is no overarching privacy regula-
tion in the United States. However, the federal government has  
enacted regulations concerning specific aspects of privacy, such  
 
82 See generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
83 See id. at 484. 
84 See generally Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (discussing common law 
privacy protections). 
85 Ana Swanson, Trump Bans Alipay and 7 Other Chinese Apps, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 
2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/05/technology/china-app-ban.html [https://per 
ma.cc/FK3N-84A3]; Ana Swanson, Trump Admin to Ban TikTok and WeChat from U.S. 
App Stores, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/ 
18/business/trump-tik-tok-wechat-ban.html [https://perma.cc/3WYT-Z86R]. 
86 Brooke Auxier et al., Americans and Privacy: Concerned, Confused, and Feeling 




87 Sandra Wachter & Brent Mittelstadt, A Right to Reasonable Inferences: Re-Thinking 
Data Protection Law in the Age of Big Data and AI, COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 6–7 (2019) 
(“These methods can be used to nudge or manipulate us, or to make important decisions 
(e.g., loan or employment decisions) about us. The intuitive link between actions and 
perceptions is being eroded, leading to a loss of control over identity and how individuals 
are perceived by others. Concerns about algorithmic accountability are often actually 
concerns about the way in which these technologies draw privacy-invasive and non-
verifiable inferences that cannot be predicted, understood, or refuted.”). Id. at 4. 
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as the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (“COPPA”).88 
COPPA aims to regulate the information collected about children 
under the age of thirteen.89 In 1998, legislators created the Act to 
reduce harms, such as online harassment and sexual predators, that 
can result from the use and collection of children’s personal infor-
mation.90 COPPA requires websites directed toward children to give 
notice about what information is collected and how it is used.91 The 
Federal Trade Commission is solely responsible for enforcing 
COPPA, and imposes fines on websites that violate the Act.92 
Although it is enforced,93 COPPA is widely criticized as inef-
fective.94 Social media companies, such as Facebook, are especially 
criticized for “circumventing” COPPA.95 While Facebook’s privacy 
policy does not allow users under the age of thirteen, the platform 
does not take adequate action to restrict young users.96 Even if they 
read the policy, children often create social media sites anyway by 
falsifying their birth year or just choosing to create an account.97 
Therefore, these websites are still collecting personal information 
from children. In addition to being criticized for simply not working, 
COPPA is also criticized as a burden on smaller businesses due to 
 
88 Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, §§ 1301–
1308, 112 Stat. 2681 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506). Other examples 
include the Health Insurance Portability and Accounting Act (“HIPAA”), which controls 
the collection of our health information, the Gramm Leach Biley Act, which governs our 
personal information relating to banks and finance, and the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 
which governs the collection and use of credit data. Health Insurance Portability and 
Accounting Act (HIPAA), Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 18, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).  
89 Lauren A. Matecki, Note, Update: COPPA is Ineffective Legislation! Next Steps for 
Protecting Youth Privacy Rights in the Social Networking Era, 5 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y. 
369, 370 (2010). 
90 See id. at 369, 390. 
91 15 U.S.C. § 6502 (b)(1)(A)(i)–(ii). 
92 Matecki, supra note 89, at 376. 
93 See id. at 382. 
94 See id.  
95 Shannon Finnegan, Note, How Facebook Beat the Children’s Online Privacy 
Protection Act: A Look into the Continued Ineffectiveness of COPPA and How to Hold 
Social Media Sites Accountable in the Future, 50 SETON HALL L. REV. 827, 828 (2020). 
96 Id. 
97 Stephen Beemsterboer, COPPA Killed the Video Star: How the YouTube Settlement 
Shows that COPPA Does More Harm than Good, 25 ILL. BUS. L.J. 63, 68–69 (2020) 
(discussing “easily falsifiable age verification methods”). 
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the legal costliness of compliance, and for failing to protect minors 
over thirteen.98 
In the absence of effective federal privacy legislation, states 
have begun to address the privacy issue. As of 2019, at least twenty-
five states have filed bills or drafts to implement privacy regula-
tions.99 In November 2020, California passed the California Privacy 
Rights Act (“CPRA”).100 The CPRA is an extension of the Califor-
nia Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 (“CCPA”) and regulates the use 
of personal data.101 The CPRA was enacted because the CCPA did 
not protect Californians’ privacy in the way the legislature had 
hoped.102 Californians for Consumer Privacy, sponsors of the 
CCPA, described that:  
[S]ince we passed CCPA, two things have happened: 
First, some of the world’s largest companies have  
actively and explicitly prioritized weakening the  
law. Second, technological tools have evolved in 
ways that exploit a consumer’s data with potentially  
dangerous consequences. We believe using a con-
sumer’s data in these ways is not only immoral, but 
threatens our democracy.103 
The CPRA aims to give individuals the right to know, the right 
to say no, and the right to hold big corporations accountable.104  
This regulation covers how data is being used, gives individuals the 
ability to opt out of having their data collected, and creates a new 
government agency for the enforcement and compliance of privacy 
 
98 Matecki, supra note 89, at 382. 
99 2019 Consumer Data Privacy Regulation, NCSL (Jan. 3, 2020), 
https://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/consum 
er-data-privacy.aspx [https://perma.cc/ZCP8-2C4C]. 
100 California Consumer Privacy Act, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100–99. 
101 Lisa Dick, What is the CPRA vs the CCPA? And Why Does It Matter?, DIGIT. 
EXPERIENCE AGENCY (Aug. 20, 2020), https://www.degdigital.com/insights/cpra-vs-ccpa-
data-privacy/ [https://perma.cc/K4QP-5BL7]. 
102 How Prop. 24 Strengthens Privacy Rights for Californians, CALIFORNIANS FOR 
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regulations.105 The CPRA will impose fines on those who violate 
personal privacy, fining up to $7,500 per intentional violation or  
violation involving those under sixteen.106 
While federal data regulation in the United States has been 
somewhat ineffective, the European Union adopted an all-encom-
passing data protection law known as the General Data Protection 
Regulation (“GDPR”) in 2016.107 The GDPR is likely the most ex-
pansive example of data and privacy protection. To protect the pri-
vacy of European citizens, the GDPR regulates the use, storage, dis-
closure, or any other use of personal information.108 If data is clas-
sified as personal, or any information that can identify an individual, 
there must be a lawful basis to use that data.109 These bases include 
consent, legal obligations, and public interest.110 In the absence of a 
justified legal basis, the use of personal data is prohibited.111 
The GDPR additionally provides EU citizens with data rights.112 
These rights allow European citizens to ask what information is col-
lected about them and how it is used.113 Europeans can also correct 
mistaken information, or have their data deleted from records com-
pletely.114 This is in stark contrast to the United States, which does 
not provide its citizens such control.115 The legislation also requires 
 
105 Id. 
106 Cynthia Cole, Matthew R. Baker, & Katherine Burgess, Move Over, CCPA: The 
California Privacy Rights Act Gets the Spotlight Now, BLOOMBERG L. (Nov. 16, 2020, 4:00 
AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/privacy-and-data-security/move-over-ccpa-the-
california-privacy-rights-act-gets-the-spotlight-now [https://perma.cc/MNQ5-NVFQ]. 
107 GDPR, supra note 11. 
108 See id. art. 4(2). Exceptions are that the GDPR does not apply to the use of personal 
data (1) in activity that falls outside the scope of EU law; (2) by EU nations carrying out 
foreign policy and national security objectives; (3) by an individual in the course of a purely 
personal; and (4) by those conducting criminal investigations and prosecutions. Id. art. 
2(2). 
109 See STEPHEN P. MULLIGAN ET AL., CONG. RSCH. SERV., DATA PROTECTION LAW: AN 
OVERVIEW 43 (Mar. 25, 2019).  
110 See id. 
111    See id. 
112 GDPR, supra note 11, arts. 12–23. 
113 Id. arts. 12–15. 
114 Id. arts. 16–17. 
115 See Vaidya Gullapalli, The U.S. Has No “Right to be Forgotten.” But One News 
Outlet Has Been Weighing the Costs of the Internet’s Long Memory, THE APPEAL (Nov. 6, 
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companies to actively protect personal data, such as requiring the 
implementation of a data protection officer.116 
To ensure compliance, the GDPR imposes severe fines on vio-
lators. These fines apply to all types of business (and even individ-
uals), and the amount of the fine varies with the size of the busi-
ness.117 The amount fined also depends on the severity of the viola-
tion, and regulators will consider factors such as the gravity and na-
ture of the act, the company’s intentions, and relevant previous in-
fringements.118 Less severe violations can be up to ten million euros, 
or two percent of the company’s worldwide annual revenue.119 A 
more serious violation can be double that: up to twenty million euros 
or four percent of the company’s worldwide annual revenue.120 
Fines have been as small as twenty-eight euros for sending un-
wanted emails and as large as over twenty-two million euros for 
having inadequate security measures to prevent cyber-attacks.121 
3. Tax Law 
“In this world, nothing is certain except death and taxes.” 




5SPD] (describing the lack of the “the right to be forgotten,” or the right to delete your 
information from the internet, in the United States). 
116 GDPR, supra note 11, arts. 37–39. 
117 Ben Wolford, What Are the GDPR Fines?, GDPR EU, https://gdpr.eu/fines/ 
[https://perma.cc/6YPJ-YW6M].  
118 See id. 
119 See id. 
120 See id. 
121 In 2020, an organization was fined €28 when a customer updated their email address 
but continued to receive emails to the old address. GDPR Enforcement Tracker, CMS, 
https://www.enforcementtracker.com/ETid-523 [https://perma.cc/XJZ9-ERR4]. The same 
year, British Airways was fined €22,046,000 for allowing a hacker website to take data 
from over 500,000 customers. The Information Commissioner found their inadequate data 
security violated the GDPR. See GDPR Fines Tracker & Statistics, PRIVACYAFFAIRS, 
https://www.privacyaffairs.com/gdpr-fines/ [https://perma.cc/HGW3-RN44].  
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Taxation is considered to be fundamental to our society.122 The 
U.S. tax system employs various types of taxes, such as the corpo-
rate tax, personal income tax, property tax, federal tax, and state 
tax.123 Taxes are needed to raise revenue for the public good, such 
as our public education, healthcare, and environmental projects.124 
In addition to needing taxes to fund our government and public 
works, taxes also serve the functions of redistribution and regula-
tion.125 The redistributive function aims to reduce the monetary in-
equality between the wealthiest and the poorest.126 In developed 
countries, the personal income tax is viewed as the primary method 
of redistribution.127 The regulatory function is seen as a way to im-
pact private sector activities, and the corporate income tax was seen 
specifically as a way to regulate corporations.128 The corporate tax 
was proposed by President William Howard Taft as a way to 
achieve, “supervisory control of corporations which may prevent a 
further abuse of power.”129 
In the early 1900s, the United States began adopting these regu-
latory corporate taxes to encourage or deter certain forms of corpo-
rate activity.130 However, in 1974, the government introduced tax 
expenditures to encourage spending decisions, specifically for cor-
porations and those with the funds to make investments.131 This es-
sentially means that some paid little to no taxes, so that they would 
have more money to spend and bring into the economy.132 Since 
 
122  A Taxing Problem: How to Ensure the Poor and Vulnerable Don’t Shoulder the Cost 
of the COVID-19 Crisis, UN NEWS (July 12, 2020), https://news.un.org/en/story/ 
2020/07/1068111 [https://perma.cc/6CNX-ZN66]. 
123 The Three Basic Tax Types, TAX FOUND., https://taxfoundation.org/the-three-basic-
tax-types/ [https://perma.cc/A8D9-FRTQ]. 
124 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Three Goals of Taxation, 60 TAX L. REV. 1, 3 (2006). 
125 See id. 
126 See id. 
127 Richard M. Bird & Eric M. Zolt, Redistribution via Taxation: The Limited Role of the 
Personal Income Tax in Developing Countries, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1627, 1629 (2005). 
128 Avi-Yonah, supra note 124, at 3, 22. 
129 44 CONG. REC. 3,344 (daily ed. June 16, 1909) (statement of President Taft). 
130 Avi-Yonah, supra note 124, at 22. 
131 Id. at 24–25; William McBride, A Brief History of Tax Expenditures, TAX FOUND. 
(Aug. 22, 2013), https://taxfoundation.org/brief-history-tax-expenditures/ [https://per 
ma.cc/2P8C-PCYA]. 
132 Avi-Yonah, supra note 124, at 23–24. 
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these tax expenditures mostly benefited the rich, they greatly de-
creased the effectiveness of the revenue and redistribution func-
tions.133 This led to numerous reforms to the tax code to close loop-
holes and reduce the large amount of tax avoidance seen by the 
wealthy,134 which were generally ineffective because of new and 
emerging tax incentives.135 
Some taxes are charged as a rate based upon a percentage.136 
This allows for the same tax percentage to be paid by everyone, such 
as a sales tax, but the dollar amount of tax increases as the purchase 
price increases.137 These taxes can be progressive, such that the tax 
rate will increase as the taxable amount increases, or regressive, 
meaning the tax rate decreases as the taxable amount increases.138 
As opposed to being calculated as a percentage, specific taxes—or 
per unit taxes—are flat rates. Per unit taxes are a fixed amount per a 
quantity of good, independent of its actual price.139 Per unit taxes 
 
133 Id. at 23. 
134 See Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 301, 83 Stat. 487, 580 (adopting 
the alternative minimum tax (AMT)). The AMT became a burden on the middle class. See 
Avi-Yonah, supra note 124, at 23.; see also Congressional Budget and Impoundment 
Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, § 601, 88 Stat. 297, 323 (adopting a tax 
expenditure budget); see generally Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 
2085. 
135 See Avi-Yonah, supra note 124, at 23 (referencing the American Jobs Creation Act 
of 2004 and the Energy Policy Act of 2005 as examples of ways tax incentives are created 
despite the “anti-tax expenditure movement”). Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418; Pub. 
L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594. 
136 See Alexander M. Hess, Seven Ways Americans Pay Taxes, USA TODAY (Jan. 4, 
2014), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/personalfinance/2014/01/04/taxes-
americans-pay/4307825/ [https://perma.cc/95EA-GXWK]. Some examples include 
corporate and personal income taxes, sales taxes, and payroll taxes. 
137 See id. 
138 Progressive Tax, CORP. FIN. INST., https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/ 
knowledge/accounting/progressive-tax-system/ [https://perma.cc/U72G-DBSV]. 
139 Specific Tax, ECONOMICSHELP, https://www.economicshelp.org/blog/glossary/ 
specific-tax/ [https://perma.cc/75F5-QELM]. Current federal per unit taxes include items 
such as tobacco products, alcohol, and gasoline. What Are the Major Federal Excise Taxes, 
and How Much Money Do They Raise?, TAX POL’Y CTR., https://www.taxpolicy 
center.org/briefing-book/what-are-major-federal-excise-taxes-and-how-much-money-do-
they-raise [https://perma.cc/RY9R-3D57] [hereinafter Major Federal Excise Taxes]. The 
per unit tobacco tax is $1.01 per pack of cigarettes (the price of which ranges country-wide 
from about $5 to $13). See Cigarette Prices by State, FAIR REPS. (Jan. 17, 2020), 
https://fairreporters.net/health/prices-of-cigarettes-by-state/ [https://perma.cc/4SRH-
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are often used to deter behavior and are considered to have a greatest 
effect on reducing the overall demand of a good.140 A portion of the 
revenue from these taxes is often used to combat harms which the 
good creates.141  For example, revenue from tobacco taxes is used to 
fund health insurance,  as well as tobacco prevention programs.142  
As of publication, the corporate tax is 21%, which is the lowest 
corporate tax rate since 1939.143 It was reduced from 35% in 2017, 
and with this tax cut also came a provision which allowed global 
companies to not be taxed on foreign profits.144 While the previous 
statutory tax rate was 35%, the effective tax rate of profitable For-
tune 500 companies between 2008 and 2015 was actually 21.2% af-
ter exemptions.145 In 2018, with the corporate tax already reduced 
to 21%, the most profitable companies averaged an 11% effective 
tax rate.146 This average includes the profitable companies who paid 
a negative tax bill, such as Netflix and General Motors.147 
 
FJ4E]. The per unit distilled spirits tax is $13.50 per proof gallon, and the per unit tax on 
gasoline is about $0.18 a gallon (the national average price of which is $2.39). Id.; Julia 
Kagan, What is an Excise Tax?, INVESTOPEDIA (Apr. 28, 2020), https://www.investo 
pedia.com/terms/e/excisetax.asp [https://perma.cc/WY9A-N4HA]. 
140 See Julia Kagan, Sin Tax, INVESTOPEDIA (July 31, 2020), https://www.investo 
pedia.com/terms/s/sin_tax.asp [https://perma.cc/Y9RJ-P5WE] (explaining how specific 
taxes are used as “sin taxes” on products like tobacco, alcohol, and gambling ventures); 
Specific Tax, supra note 139. 




142 Cigarette & Tobacco Taxes, AMERICAN LUNG ASSOCIATION, https://www.lung.org/ 
policy-advocacy/tobacco/tobacco-taxes [https://perma.cc/T3QP-6QDL]. 
143 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 13001; Kimberly Amadeo, U.S. 
Corporate Income Tax Rate, Its History, and the Effective Rate, THE BALANCE (Feb. 2, 
2021), https://www.thebalance.com/corporate-income-tax-definition-history-effective-
rate-3306024 [https://perma.cc/SJ42-ACZH]. 
144 Amadeo, supra note 143. 
145 Matthew Johnston, How Fortune 500 Companies Avoid Paying Taxes, INVESTOPEDIA 
(Jan. 28, 2021), https://www.investopedia.com/news/how-fortune-500-companies-avoid-
paying-income-tax/ [https://perma.cc/QT74-JW3R]. 
146 Id. 
147 See Kathryn Kranhold, You Paid Taxes. These Corporations Didn’t., THE CENTER FOR 
PUBLIC INTEGRITY (Apr. 11, 2019), https://publicintegrity.org/inequality-poverty-
opportunity/taxes/trumps-tax-cuts/you-paid-taxes-these-corporations-didnt/ 
[https://perma.cc/HFV4-L9ZV]. 
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II. THE TIMES THEY ARE A-CHANGIN’, THE LAWS STAY THE SAME 
Data use has widespread effects on society, which are not always 
positive.148 To combat this, the United States and several countries 
have employed their versions of solutions to the misuses of data.149 
However, these solutions are generally focused on privacy, and do 
not allow the public to be compensated for their contributions. This 
Part will elaborate on the ways our laws allow data to be taken freely 
and discuss the reasons individuals should be compensated for their 
data. Unregulated data use creates far-reaching societal harms, spe-
cifically in relation to corporate tax practices. While there are nu-
merous approaches to data reform, none have been able to provide 
both data compensation and data privacy. 
A. How Gaps in Our Current Law Allow Data to be a “Free 
Resource” 
Property, privacy, and tax laws confer many benefits to the pub-
lic, but compensation for data is not one of them. While the most 
straightforward solution would be requiring companies to pay indi-
viduals directly for their data,150 that possibility is not as simple as 
 
148 See Joanna Redden, Six Ways (and Counting) that Big Data Systems are Harming 
Society, THECONVERSATION (Dec. 7, 2017), https://theconversation.com/six-ways-and-
counting-that-big-data-systems-are-harming-society-88660 [https://perma.cc/DSZ5-
77MS]. 
149 See generally Mulligan, supra note 109, which details some federal data protection 
laws, as well as California’s measures for data security. Numerous countries impose 
criminal penalties for those who create false information online and some countries (and 
California) prosecute those who use automation to amplify it. Misuses of these penalties 
have already been seen in Iran, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Tanzania, who have imposed 
these criminal charges on those spreading false information, but also on minorities, 
political nonconformists, and human rights defenders. SAMANTHA BRADSHAW, LISA-
MARIA NEUDERT & PHILIP N. HOWARD, GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO MALICIOUS USE OF 
SOCIAL MEDIA 4 (Anna Reynolds ed., 2018). Some countries, such as Italy, give internet 
users the ability to report false information and use government initiatives to monitor these 
complaints. Yasmeen Serhan, Italy Scrambles to Fight Misinformation Ahead of Its 
Elections, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 24, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/ 
archive/2018/02/europe-fake-news/551972/ [https://perma.cc/4D9G-3XTP].  
150 Makena Kelly, Andrew Yang Is Pushing Big Tech to Pay Users for Data, THE VERGE 
(June 22, 2020), https://www.theverge.com/2020/6/22/21298919/andrew-yang-big-tech-
data-dividend-project-facebook-google-ubi [https://perma.cc/52SV-55FE] (describing 
Yang’s plan to create a “data dividend”). For criticism of this plan, see Will Rinehart, 
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one might think.151 To sell the data, or to receive payment for data, 
individuals would have to own it. Although it is technically their 
data because they “created” it, our laws do not allow data to have a 
legal owner.152 Intellectual property laws do not protect factual in-
formation, which is exactly what data is.153 While people generate 
this information, they do not necessarily “create” it as defined by 
law, and property laws intentionally exclude data from their defini-
tions.154 Without these property rights, there is no legal right to sell 
data. Therefore, individuals do not have the legal standing to de-
mand payment for its collection. 
Privacy laws regulate the use of data and can prohibit companies 
from profiting from certain data types, but also fail to compensate 
the public for data that is collected.155 Such laws do not directly cre-
ate avenues to receive payment for information, nor is there cur-
rently an overarching privacy law that would provide compensation 
to the entire country. Further, privacy regulations do not extend to 
all data types, but focus on personal data. However, there is still 
value in engagement, behavioral, and attitudinal data. Therefore, 
even if privacy legislation contained ways to compensate the public, 
it would fail to do so for all of the data that society generates. 
Tax laws further fail to compensate the public because there is 
no tax on data. Unlike other collected resources, which would be 
subject to a sales tax, data is not always sold.156 Under U.S. laws, 
companies can freely collect information about all citizens. If there 
is no sale, a company does not have to pay a sales tax on the re-
source. Therefore, revenue is not being contributed back to society 
for the information that is taken from it—instead, it is merely used 
to create profits. 
 
Andrew Yang’s Plan to Pay for Your Data Doesn’t Add Up, WIRED (July 16, 2020), 
https://www.wired.com/story/opinion-andrew-yangs-plan-to-pay-you-for-your-data-
doesnt-add-up/ [https://perma.cc/24C3-DUHJ]. 
151 Kerry & Morris, supra note 10. 
152 See Determann, supra note 69, at 26. 
153 See id. 
154 See id. at 42–43. 
155 See, e.g., California Consumer Privacy Act, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.145. 
156 See infra notes 295–299 and accompanying text. 
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Tax expenditures on those profits also allow numerous compa-
nies to avoid the social responsibilities created by their relationship 
with consumers. The average person relies on large companies for 
their food, clothes, basic necessities, and most of their infor-
mation.157 Due to this reliance, our modern society expects a certain 
social responsibility to be imposed on these corporations, such that 
they contribute towards the betterment of society.158 Companies 
have accepted this responsibility and not only act reasonably to en-
sure their customers are not harmed, but also donate profits to other 
social organizations.159 Even so, the current trend of tax expendi-
tures and deductions can be considered a corporate avoidance of 
their social responsibility. The largest corporations are paying taxes 
far below their statutory rate, and sometimes no taxes at all,160 which 
is depriving our society of necessary funds and requiring individuals 
to make up the missing revenue. Unsurprisingly, the companies that 
avoid paying such taxes are often the same companies collecting our 
data without payment.161 
B. Why Individuals Should Be Compensated for Their Data 
 
“Nothing is free. Everything has to be paid for. For every profit in 
one thing, payment in some other thing.” 
– Ted Hughes 
 
157 Note that since the Covid-19 pandemic, this reliance has only increased. The closing 
of small businesses has led to an even greater reliance on large companies, and these 
companies’ profits have significantly increased while smaller companies have closed. For 
example, Amazon has reported a 70% increase in earnings in the last nine months, and 
80% of S&P 500 companies have reported earnings that are larger than expected. Peter 
Eavis & Niraj Chokshi, While the Pandemic Wrecked Some Businesses, Others Did Fine. 
Even Great, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 10, 2020), https://www.chicagotribune.com/coronavirus/sns-
nyt-companies-profits-losses-coronavirus-20201110-4odk4jvnczbnnmtth5pc32vp6q-
story.html [https://perma.cc/RT5N-TM8M].  
158 See Narotzki, supra note 12, at 184. 
159 Id. 
160 See supra notes 143–151 and accompanying text. 
161 For example, eleven “massive tech and transportation companies,” such as Netflix 
and Amazon, paid no tax during 2018. Aaron Holmes, From Amazon to GM, Here Are All 
the Major Tech and Transportation Companies Who Avoided Federal Income Taxes Last 
Year, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 24, 2019), https://www.businessinsider.com/tech-companies-
dont-pay-federal-income-taxes-amazon-gm-2019-11 [https://perma.cc/FP8V-E3RL].  
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Businesses use data to understand consumers, so that they can 
keep them engaged with their platform or target them with adver-
tisements.162 This goal has led companies to incorrectly brand peo-
ple as one thing: consumers. Despite this sentiment, society’s data 
is some companies’ most valuable resource.163 Therefore, consider-
ing this crucial resource is harvested from individual actions, the 
general public acts as suppliers and laborers.164 
Without the information that each person supplies to AI systems, 
the technology that companies rely on would cease to exist. Without 
analyzing millions of faces, Snapchat filters would not be possi-
ble.165 Without tracking the speeds and locations of individuals, sys-
tems like Waze would not be able to function.166 Practically every 
move, or lack of movement, is used to train AI, find new patterns, 
and make a profit. Every time someone makes a decision, they’re 
essentially a laborer that creates and supplies data. 
In the most recent century, it is generally understood that sup-
pliers and laborers are paid for their contributions. This understand-
ing is maintained regardless of the difficulty of the work, or the ef-
fort put into the labor. However, most empires were historically built 
on free labor.167 The Egyptian, Roman, Ottoman, Russian, Spanish, 
and American empires all implemented slavery, serfdom, or some 
 
162 Bridget Botelho, Big Data, TECHTARGET, https://searchdatamanagement.tech 
target.com/definition/big-data [https://perma.cc/F63B-NC3B]. 
163 See Regulating the Internet Giants: The World’s Most Valuable Resource Is No 
Longer Oil, but Data, THE ECONOMIST (May 6, 2017), http://www.economist.com/ 
news/leaders/21721656-data-economy-demands-new-approach-antitrust-rules-worlds-
most-valuable-resource [https://perma.cc/62E4-5ZUV]. 
164 See Eduardo Porter, Your Data Is Crucial to a Robotic Age. Shouldn’t You Be Paid 
for It?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/06/ 
business/economy/user-data-pay.html [https://perma.cc/7MX3-THZJ].  
165 See, e.g., Jeremy Horwitz, Snapchat’s Time Machine Lens Uses AI to Age and De-
age Selfies, VENTUREBEAT (Nov. 21, 2019), https://venturebeat.com/2019/11/21/ 
snapchats-time-machine-lens-uses-ai-to-age-and-de-age-selfies/  
[https://perma.cc/HH2G-R4CS].  
166 See Rosalyn Link, How Waze Uses AI to Navigate and Dominate the Game, MEDIUM 
(Oct. 20, 2019), https://medium.com/marketing-right-now/how-waze-uses-ai-to-navigate-
and-dominate-the-game-729e075a09b2 [https://perma.cc/X7F8-QQG3].  
167 See A Brief History of Slavery, NEW INTERNATIONALIST (Aug. 5, 2001), 
https://newint.org/features/2001/08/05/history [https://perma.cc/G2T9-DTFG].  
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other form of free labor to gain power.168 Unfortunately, the techno-
logical empire is no different. 
As described in a 2018 economics paper,169 current problems 
with the data economy stem from not recognizing data as labor.170 
In the same way that previous empires exploited society, tech giants 
are exploiting society to create the “modern data slavery market.”171 
This term encompasses the exploitation of free data labor, as well as 
the “enslavement” of the government and society to tech giants.172 
Critics of this theory argue that people access these platforms free 
of charge, and should not receive an additional benefit for data 
use.173 American author and law professor Eric Posner, tech philos-
opher Jaron Lanier, and principal researcher at Microsoft Glen Weyl 
counter that free use of these platforms is not adequate payment 
when considering the immense profits generated from the use of our 
data.174 These scholars also note that large companies are collecting 
information without compensating individuals, and then using that 
information to create AI which replaces them in the workforce.175 
Essentially, people are losing their jobs to robots they unknowingly 
created. Job loss creates financial harms, and there is a societal need 
to receive some benefit for our information. They argue that indi-
viduals are entitled to compensation for their data not only because 
they supply it, but also because it creates risks to their source of in-
come.176 As with conventional forced labor, society must not toler-
ate the modern exploited data laborer. 
It should also be noted that prior to the introduction of AI, soci-
ety expected to be compensated for supplying information. Market 
 
168 Slavery in History, THE HISTORY PRESS, https://www.thehistorypress.co.uk/ 
articles/slavery-in-history/ [https://perma.cc/V96F-WXJY]. 
169 See Arrieta-Ibarra et al., supra note 24. 
170 Id. 
171 Matthew Pirkowski, Data Slavery and Decentralized Emancipation, MEDIUM (June 
21, 2018), https://medium.com/swlh/data-slavery-and-decentralized-emancipation-ec9cc 
1265608 [https://perma.cc/7CWF-ELHX].  
172 Pirkowski argues that society is “enslaved” to tech giants because the technology our 
data creates can influence our actions and purchase habits. Id. 
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research has been a popular tool for companies for over a century, 
and businesses historically invested substantial funds into obtaining 
consumer information.177 Individuals were paid for their opinions or 
personal information because they were needed to obtain it. Since 
the introduction of AI, companies no longer have to ask about pur-
chase behaviors or interests. Instead, businesses can circumvent this 
step by obtaining information directly from your bank or location.178 
Data is generally not seen as a resource because it is obtained with-
out someone’s knowledge or interference.179 Even so, some compa-
nies are still willing to pay individuals hundreds of dollars an hour 
for the same information that larger companies take for free.180 Alt-
hough it is easier to obtain, our data is more valuable than ever.181 
The law should reflect this value and allow people to benefit from 
the wealth their data creates. 
C. The Effects of Corporate Tax Avoidance 
Tax research concerning corporate tax avoidance has become 
more active in the past decade.182 Originally, tax expenditures were 
created to incentivize those with wealth to continue to spend and 
 
177 Fred Phillips & Dan Merchant, The US Consumer Panel Industry, 1940-2020: 
Lessons for the Age of Big Data, AM. BUS. HIST. CTR. (July 4, 2020), 
https://americanbusinesshistory.org/the-us-consumer-panel-industry-1940-2000-lessons-
for-the-age-of-big-data [https://perma.cc/P427-KG3W].  
178 How Some Companies Are Profiting Off Consumer Data, CNBC (Apr. 24, 2019), 
https://www.cnbc.com/video/2019/04/24/how-some-companies-are-profiting-off-of-
consumer-data.html [https://perma.cc/84ZK-XY7L] (describing how satellites track 
individuals’ movements, as well as downloaded apps, which give companies data on where 
consumers are shopping). The video also describes how banking transactional history data 
is obtained and sold to investors. Id. 
179 Alix Langone, We Talked to Security Experts About How to Protect Your Online Data. 
Here’s What They Said, MONEY.COM, (April 17, 2018), https://money.com/how-to-protect-
personal-information/ [https://perma.cc/KBX9-QMJY] 
180 See, e.g., How to Make $150 in an Hour with Focus Groups and Get a Free Coffee 
Too!, GATHERING DREAMS (Aug. 3, 2020), https://gatheringdreams.com/online-focus-
groups/ [https://perma.cc/2EJ4-UDDA]; Brittney, 20 Best Paid Online Focus Groups: 
Make $300/hr, STRUGGLE.CO, https://struggle.co/paid-online-focus-groups/ [https://per 
ma.cc/J3EE-VR38]. 
181 See supra Section I.A.2. 
182    Michelle Hanlon & Shane Heitzman, A Review of Tax Research, 50 J. ACCT. & ECON. 
no. 2–3 127, 128 (2010) (describing corporate tax avoidance research as “young, but very 
active"). See also Martin Jacob, A Note on Tax Research, REVISTA CONTABILIDADE & 
FINANÇAS 339, 342 (2018). 
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invest.183 The continuous addition of expenditures allowed corpo-
rate tax avoidances to become so large that the amounts have sur-
passed the entire budget of developing countries.184 Currently, most 
companies’ effective tax rate is nowhere near the statutory require-
ment after accounting for credits and exemptions.185 For example, 
during the years 2008-2015, 20% of Fortune 500 companies avoided 
paying income taxes in at least one year, while their combined pre-
tax income was $336 billion.186 
The Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy found that in 
2018, ninety-one of the most profitable companies paid no tax or a 
negative tax.187 These companies include Amazon, who profited 
over $10 billion but paid an effective tax rate of negative 1%; and 
IBM, who profited $500 million and paid an effective tax rate of 
negative 68%.188 In other words, IBM was expected to pay around 
$105 million in corporate taxes in 2018, but instead received $342 
million.189 In 2018 alone, corporations claimed $73.9 billion in tax 
subsidies.190 This lowers tax revenue by $73.9 billion which must 
be repaid by individuals, including low-income families.191 
A large percent of Fortune 500 companies are not contributing 
profits to the tax revenue,192 which inhibits individuals from sharing 
in the wealth their data creates. According to Adobe’s 2019 Chief 
Information Officer (“CIO”) Perspectives Survey, eighty percent of 
 
183 Avi-Yonah, supra note 124, at 23. 
184 Gio Wiederhold, The Effect of Corporate Tax Avoidance on Society in ECOLOGICAL, 
SOCIETAL, AND TECHNOLOGICAL RISKS AND THE FINANCIAL SECTOR 163, 163 (Thomas 
Walker et al. eds., 2020). 
185 See Johnston, supra note 145. 
186 Id. 
187 Matthew Gardner, Lorena Roque, & Steve Wamhoff, Corporate Tax Avoidance in the 
First Year of the Trump Tax Law, INST. ON TAX’N AND ECON. POL’Y (Dec. 16, 2019), 
https://itep.org/corporate-tax-avoidance-in-the-first-year-of-the-trump-tax-law/ 
[https://perma.cc/33UW-R2UJ]. 
188 Kranhold, supra note 147. Another 15% of these companies paid effective tax rates 
that averaged about 2%. Id. 
189 See id. 
190 Lorena Roque, Why Corporate Tax Matters, INST. ON TAX’N AND ECON. POL’Y (Dec. 
18, 2019), https://itep.org/why-corporate-tax-avoidance-matters/ [https://perma.cc/R6W8-
EW5M]. 
191 Id. 
192 See id. 
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U.S. CIOs planned to increase the use of artificial intelligence—and 
therefore data—in 2020.193 Tech giants especially, and other large 
companies that utilize data, are avoiding taxes on that profit.194 Cur-
rent laws allow the untaxed harvesting of this valuable resource, and 
allow tax avoidance on its monetization.195 Not only are members 
of society not compensated for their valuable information, but they 
are tasked with accounting for the tax which companies’ avoid.196 
When also considering the effect of data on the job market, there 
is even less capital being added to the tax revenue.197 In 2017, the 
corporate tax rate was reduced from 35% to 21%.198 With the use of 
artificial intelligence and technology, companies are employing 
fewer people and replacing them with robots, significantly reducing 
the number of taxable salaries.199 This allows for companies to in-
crease their profits through lowered taxes and fewer employees, 
causing individuals to face higher taxes and a lack of jobs.200 Many 
have already called for a tax solution to this issue, such as Bill Gates’ 
proposition to tax robots directly.201 
 
193 See Lance Lambert, Exclusive: Why an Artificial Intelligence Wave Could Hit the 
Business World in 2020, FORTUNE (Nov. 19, 2019), https://fortune.com/ 
2019/11/19/artificial-intelligence-2020-cio-survey/ [https://perma.cc/T2W6-NLNF]. 
194 See Mark Sullivan, These 8 Profitable Tech Giants Paid Less in Federal Taxes than 
You Did Last Year, FAST CO. (Dec. 16, 2019), https://www.fastcompany.com/ 
90443811/these-8-profitable-tech-giants-paid-less-in-federal-taxes-than-you-did-last-year 
[https://perma.cc/X95B-U5RR]. 
195 See infra notes 291–295 and accompanying text. 
196 Roque, supra note 190. (“The ITEP report estimates that the federal government lost 
approximately $73.9 billion in potential revenue in 2018 alone due to tax breaks allowing 
corporations to pay less than the statutory rate of 21 percent. The cost falls on individuals 
and families, including low- and moderate-income families, who must pay in the form of 
reduced public services or higher taxes to make up for lost revenue.”) 
197 When companies have a negative tax rate, they not only fail to pay tax, but are actually 
given money from the government. See Gardner et al. supra note 187.  
198    Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 13001.  
199 Porter, supra note 164. 
200   See Sahadi, infra note 204; see also Eduardo Porter, Don’t Fight the Robots. Tax Them, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/23/Sunday-review/tax-ar-
tificial-intelligence.html [https://perma.cc/Z85A-GULJ]. It is estimated that half of jobs 
could be automated by 2055, which would reduce our tax revenue by billions of dollars 
each year. Id. It appears that “many companies invest in automation because the tax code 
encourages it, not because robots are more productive.” Id. 
201 To combat this, Bill Gates proposed taxing robots in a similar fashion as to how 
humans performing the same job would be taxed. Porter, supra note 200. 
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The reduction in corporate taxes, as well as the avoidances of 
these taxes through tax expenditures, has led to various societal 
harms.202 When the wealthiest corporations pay no tax, our govern-
ment loses hundreds of billions in revenue.203 Former President 
Barack Obama explained that corporate tax avoidance can:  
[C]ome at the expense of middle class families be-
cause that lost revenue has to be made up somewhere 
. . . . [Less tax revenue] means that we’re not invest-
ing as much as we should in schools, . . . in putting 
people back to work, . . . [and] creating more oppor-
tunities for our children.204 
Gaps in our law have allowed extremely profitable companies to 
avoid paying taxes, or to be paid back funds from our government, 
while increasing burdens on our government and individuals.205 
These harms largely stem from avoiding tax on the profit which in-
formation generates.206 
Corporate tax avoidance has also exacerbated wealth inequali-
ties.207 One goal of taxation is the redistribution of wealth.208 His-
torically, income tax has been seen as a key tool to redistribute 
wealth.209 Prior to World War II, income tax was applied to only the 
richest 10% of Americans, the funds of which were redistributed to 
everyone else.210 Due to the implementation of tax exemptions, this 
redistribution function has been greatly hindered by large 
 
202 Corporate tax avoidance leads to less federal revenue, lower-income families account-
ing for the missing revenue, and exacerbated wealth inequalities between both companies 
and individuals. See infra notes 203–238. 
203 See Porter, supra note 201. 
204 Jeanne Sahadi, Obama: Corporate Tax Avoidance and the Middle Class, CNN BUS. 
(Apr. 5, 2016), https://money.cnn.com/2016/04/05/news/economy/obama-tax-inversion/ 
[https://perma.cc/5G4W-LVJX]. 
205    See id.; See Gardner et al., supra note 187. 
206    Since the wealthiest companies not only obtain data without payment but can also 
avoid taxes on the profit that information generates, a large portion of the harms from tax 
avoidance stem from the data industry. See Sullivan, supra note 194 for examples of tech 
companies avoiding taxes. 
207    Suresh Nallareddy et al., Working Paper 24598 http://www.nber.org/papers/w24598 
(finding that corporate tax cuts since 2017 have increased wealth inequality). 
208 See Avi-Yonah, supra note 124, at 11. 
209 See id.  
210 See id. 
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corporations.211 In basically every country, corporate wealth is pos-
sessed by the wealthiest people.212 In the United States, 90% of cor-
porate stock is owned by the richest 10%.213 In 2016, the wealthiest 
1% had more money than the rest of the world combined, and sixty-
two people alone had half of humanity’s wealth.214 Our laws allow 
the wealthiest people to avoid taxes on this wealth, becoming richer 
as the average citizen fronts the cost.215 This wealth is often gener-
ated using society’s information, and yet the public is not paid for 
it—they are harmed by it.  
Our current tax laws create not only a disparity between the 
wealthiest and poorest people, but between companies as well.216 
Some companies receive far greater tax breaks than others, but there 
does not appear to be any clear public policy reason.217 Only twenty-
five companies account for almost half of the total tax breaks in 
2018, many of them being some of the wealthiest companies in the 
world.218 Companies are often able to receive these tax expenditures 
because they are savvy at finding loopholes within the law, not be-
cause they are necessarily “deserving.”219 For example, many of the 
wealthy multi-national companies shift profits to foreign subsidiar-
ies which are in countries with a lower tax rate.220 An Oxfam study 
which analyzed the fifty biggest companies in the United States 
found that from 2008 to 2014, such companies used over 1,600 tax-
haven subsidiaries to keep about $1.4 trillion offshore.221 This al-
lows for the larger, wealthier companies with more legal power to 
 
211 See id. at 23. 




214 Ciara Linnane, How Corporate Tax Avoidance is Hurting America and the Rest of the 
World, MARKETWATCH (Apr. 14, 2016), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/how-
corporate-tax-avoidance-is-hurting-america-and-the-rest-of-the-world-2016-04-14 
[https://perma.cc/NL6Q-6VGG]. 
215    See supra Section I.B.3. 
216    Roque, supra note 190. 
217    Id. 
218 Id. See also Kranhold, supra note 147. 
219    See Sahadi, supra note 204.  
220 Linnane, supra note 214.  
221 Id. 
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earn more and contribute far less than other companies. The compa-
nies avoiding tax grow larger, while companies that contribute to the 
tax revenue are put at a disadvantage. Data giants have become so 
large that Google, Facebook, Apple, and Amazon are all currently 
involved in legal investigations over their monopolist practices.222 
Texas attorney general Ken Paxton described, “If the free market 
were a baseball game, Google positioned itself as the pitcher, the 
batter, and the umpire.”223 
The hardships of 2020 due to the Covid-19 pandemic have cre-
ated an even greater need for tax revenue,224 as well as an even 
greater disparity among companies.225 The Covid-19 pandemic has 
resulted in a loss of jobs,226 a loss of businesses,227 and an overall 
decrease in consumption.228 It is projected that state and local gov-
ernment revenues, including fees to hospitals and higher education, 
 
222 David McCabe & Daisuke Wakabayashi, 10 States Accuse Google of Abusing 
Monopoly in Online Ads, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
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[https://perma.cc/PR6S-MWPM]; Barb Rosewicz, et al., Pandemic Drives Historic State 
Tax Revenue Drop, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-
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[https://perma.cc/7ZCW-FBL6]. 
225    James Kwak, The End of Small Business. Giant Corporations May Be the Only Sur-
vivors in the Post-Pandemic Economy, WASHINGTON POST, (July 9, 2020), 
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chains-may-be-only-ones-left/ [https://perma.cc/XEJ4-EBWH]. See also, Paul Roberts, 
The Deepening Economic Divide: How the Pandemic Has Hurt Small Businesses, THE 
SEATTLE TIMES, (Mar. 28, 2021), https://www.seattletimes.com/business/economy/the-
deepening-economic-divide-how-the-pandemic-has-hurt-small-businesses/ [https://perm 
a.cc/CRZ2-3D3N]. 
226    Kim Parker et al., Economic Fallout from Covid-19 Continues to Hit Lower-Income 
Americans the Hardest, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, (Sept. 24, 2020), https://www.pewre-
search.org/social-trends/2020/09/24/economic-fallout-from-covid-19-continues-to-hit-
lower-income-americans-the-hardest/ [https://perma.cc/HEK7-AEHD]. 
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Shut Down Due to the Pandemic Are Now Out of Business, FORTUNE, (Sept. 28, 2020), 
[https://perma.cc/X4H5-RYNT]. 
228    See Thomas Mitterling et al., The Decline and Recovery of Consumer Spending in 
the U.S., BROOKINGS, (Dec. 14, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-develop-
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will decline by $189 billion in 2021 and $167 billion in 2022.229 
Historically, decreases to state and local government revenue are 
harmful to economic recovery, as their revenue funds approximately 
13% of the total employment in the United States.230 At the same 
time that many are struggling, some of the largest corporations have 
been thriving.231 The closing of small businesses has led to an even 
greater reliance on large companies.232 The profits of large compa-
nies have significantly increased, while smaller companies are shut-
ting down.233 For example, Amazon reported a 70% increase in 
earnings in the first nine months of the year, and 80% of S&P 500 
companies reported earnings that are larger than expected.234 As 
consumers are staying home and spending more time using internet 
 
229 Louise Sheiner & Sophia Campbell, How Much Is Covid-19 Hurting State and Local 




231 See Leticia Miranda, A Tale of Two Pandemics: Big-Box Stores Rake in Record 
Profits While Small Businesses Fold, NBC NEWS, (Aug. 20, 2020), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/business/consumer/tale-two-pandemics-big-box-stores-rake-
record-profits-while-n1237464 [https://perma.cc/33GU-BZ4H]; see also Douglas 
MacMillan, et al., American’s Biggest Companies are Flourishing During the Pandemic 
and Putting Thousands of People Out of Work, (Dec. 16, 2020), https://www.washington 
post.com/graphics/2020/business/50-biggest-companies-coronavirus-layoffs/ [https://per 
ma.cc/6AQV-NRW8] (explaining that although the “coronavirus pandemic devastated 
small businesses,” 45 of the 50 most valuable publicly traded companies made a profit at 
the beginning of the pandemic). Id.  
232    For example, prior to the pandemic, entertainment sales were already shifting away 
from smaller movie theaters and concert halls towards a handful of tech companies 
(Google, Amazon, Netflix, and Disney). At the peak of business shutdowns in April of 
2020, online streaming consumption rose 81%. James Kwak, The End of Small Business. 
Giant Corporations May Be the Only Survivors in the Post-Pandemic Economy, 
WASHINGTON POST, (July 9, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/ 
07/09/after-covid-19-giant-corporations-chains-may-be-only-ones-left/ [https://perma.c 
c/B8SS-B35R]. 
233 See supra note 231. At the same time that these large companies were profitable, over 
400,000 small businesses had closed. Austan Goolsbee, Big Companies Are Starting to 
Swallow the World, N.Y. TIMES, (Sept. 30, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2020/09/30/business/big-companies-are-starting-to-swallow-the-world.html [https://per 
ma.cc/25MF-BJN4]; Anjali Sundaram, Yelp Data Shows 60% of Business Closures Due to 
the Coronavirus Pandemic are Now Permanent, CNBC, (Sept. 16, 2020), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/09/16/yelp-data-shows-60percent-of-business-closures-due-
to-the-coronavirus-pandemic-are-now-permanent.html [https://perma.cc/6X7C-PUC7]. 
234 Eavis & Chokshi, supra note 157. 
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services, companies are using their data to increase their profits 
enormously.235 The exploitation of data allows larger companies to 
gain much greater profits than smaller companies, and their tax 
avoidance allows them to retain that data profit.  
Our current laws have allowed corporations to continue to col-
lect our data and make an enormous profit from it. Corporations do 
not pay people for using their information and then avoid billions of 
dollars in taxes, retaining funds that could have been utilized for the 
education and public employment of those very people. Individuals, 
including low-income citizens, ultimately make up this revenue loss 
through their personal taxes.236 Corporate tax avoidance has led to a 
great wealth disparity between both individuals and businesses 
while preventing the redistribution of the profit data creates.  
D. Existing Ownership and Privacy Approaches to Data Reform 
While many propose that corporations pay for the use of our 
data, there are varying ideas concerning how to make this possi-
ble.237 One approach, proposed by Posner and Weyl, is to give peo-
ple ownership rights of their data so that they can sell it or restrict 
its use.238 These scholars argue that in the largest tech companies, 
the share of profit going to labor is less than 15%.239 Posner and 
 
235 Douglas MacMillan et al., American’s Biggest Companies are Flourishing During the 
Pandemic and Putting Thousands of People Out of Work, THE WASHINGTON POST (Dec. 
16, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/business/50-biggest-compani 
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Gave Up On Privacy, VOX, (Dec. 23, 2020), https://www.vox.com/recode/2218 
9727/2020-pandemic-ruined-digital-privacy [https://perma.cc/6NB6-JP7T]; Elizabeth 
Lopatto, In the Pandemic Economy, Tech Companies Are Raking It In, THE VERGE, (July 
30, 2020), https://www.theverge.com/2020/7/30/21348652/pandemic-earnings-antitrust-
google-facebook-apple-amazon [https://perma.cc/AQ7K-UQLZ]. 
236 See Sahadi, supra note 204; see also Chye-Ching Huang & Brandon DeBot, 
Corporate Tax Cuts Skew to Shareholders and CEOs, Not Workers as Administration 
Claims, CBPP, (Aug. 16, 2017), https://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-tax/corporate-tax-
cuts-skew-to-shareholders-and-ceos-not-workers-as-administration [https://perma.cc/HK 
X7-FFAH].  
237 See, e.g., Giulio Bonasera, Should Consumers Be Able to Sell Their Own Personal 
Data?, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 13, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/should-consumers-be-
able-to-sell-their-own-personal-data-11570971600 [https://perma.cc/5QF7-PBQV]; see 
also Arrieta-Ibarra et al., supra note 24; Porter, supra note 164. 
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Weyl also reason this is attributed to most companies exploiting free 
labor through the data market.240 To counter this, they argue that 
individuals should be paid directly when their data is collected and 
when that data is used to train robots.241 They recommend that data 
be treated as labor, as opposed to capital, which would create “data 
jobs” and allow data laborers to be paid for their information.242 
Their “data as labor” paradigm relies on individuals having owner-
ship of their data, so that the individual may benefit from their la-
bor.243 
Another ownership-centered approach is to compensate individ-
uals through dividends. Andrew Yang, a New York City 2021 
Mayoral Candidate, released the Data Dividend Project in 2020, 
which acts to treat data privacy rights like property rights.244 The 
project requires individuals to provide their e-mail addresses and 
match them to platforms profiting from their data.245 Then, individ-
uals would receive data-as-property rights through privacy legisla-
tion such as the CPRA, which would allow them to be paid for the 
information they supply. Yang’s vision is to eventually have profits 
directly deposited into PayPal accounts.246 
Alternative solutions to data misuse are driven by the privacy 
approach, which bans the use of certain types of data.247 Some pri-
vacy approaches seek to prohibit the use of certain technologies, 
such as facial recognition.248 Other legislative approaches seek to 
prohibit the use of certain data types, such as the GDPR and 
CPRA.249 These solutions are framed in terms of human privacy 
rights—that people have the right to know and control what happens 




242 Arrieta-Ibarra, et al., supra note 24. 
243 Id.  
244 See Kelly, supra note 150. For criticism of this plan, see Rinehart, supra note 150.  
245 See Kelly, supra note 150.  
246 Id.  
247 See supra Section I.B.2. 
248 See, e.g., Lindsey Barrett, Ban Facial Recognition Technologies for Children—And 
for Everyone Else, 26 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 223 (2020). 
249 See supra Section I.B.2. 
250 See id. 
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“[t]he current U.S. data privacy regime, premised largely upon vol-
untary industry self-regulation, is a failure.”251 These advocates call 
for solutions that generally focus on the benefit of privacy rights, as 
opposed to a monetary benefit. 
 
III. THE GAP FILLER: A CORPORATE TAX ON DATA COLLECTION 
The law has the ability to deter or encourage specific behavior, 
but it also shapes our social norms.252 Our current laws, or lack 
thereof, have allowed the outright takings and misuses of our per-
sonal information to become a normal part of our society. Data has 
become the most valuable resource in the world, and yet its suppliers 
continue to be exploited. This Part will propose a corporate data tax, 
which acts to mitigate the harms of data collection and tax avoid-
ance. Data tax revenue would “pay back” data suppliers by funding 
public works, while paving the road to greater federal privacy regu-
lation. 
A. A Tax on Big Data 
This Note proposes the implementation of a per unit tax on the 
amount of data collected in order to “compensate” society for the 
data they supply. Based upon rationales behind varying per unit 
taxes253 and recent rates of data collection,254 this Note proposes a 
 
251 Public Interest Privacy Legislation Principles, NEW AM., 
https://newamericadotorg.s3.amazonaws.com/documents/Public_Interest_Privacy_Princi
ples.pdf [https://perma.cc/YT4V-N5SR]; see also Allie Gottlieb, Persuading for Privacy, 
THE REG. REV. (Mar. 19, 2020), https://www.theregreview.org/2020/03/19/gottlieb-
persuading-privacy/ [https://perma.cc/B859-3RQS]. 
252 See Kitty Richards, An Expressive Theory of Tax, 27 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 301, 
305 (2017). 
253 See infra notes 261–264 and accompanying text. 
254 Based on information concerning data collection from 2018, it is estimated that over 
2.5 quintillion bytes (2,500,000,000,000,000,000 bytes) of data are collected daily from 
each person, amounting to a worth of approximately $1,000 per person per year. See supra 
notes 63–66. From this we calculate that a year’s worth of data–approximately 912.5 
quintillion bytes –is valued at $1,000, if not more. (912.5 quintillion bytes/year is found by 
multiplying 2.5 quintillion bytes/day by 365 days). 
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data tax rate of $0.20 for every quintillion bytes.255 This rate would 
apply to all types of data collected. Since imposing this tax on indi-
viduals would contradict its purpose, the tax on data should be  
applied as solely a corporate tax. The data tax would only be appli-
cable to large corporations and their subsidiaries, defined by the 
Code of Federal Regulations as corporations with a taxable income 
of at least one million dollars.256 In order to prevent current forms 
of tax avoidance, this data tax should not qualify for expenditures. 
Considering the constant changes to the market, the tax should be 
collected quarterly and reevaluated yearly to adjust for inflation257 
or increased value. Additionally, a portion of the tax revenue would 
be used to create an agency or committee of experts tasked with 
these evaluations. 
The suggested tax rate of $0.20 was calculated using information 
about data’s value, as well as rates of current per unit taxes. Federal 
per unit taxes on tobacco and alcohol are substantial because they 
are implemented to raise revenue as well as deter certain behav-
ior.258 For example, the federal tobacco tax was originally imple-
mented to bring in government revenue because tobacco was such a 
widely-used commodity.259 Over time, the tax was increased to deter 
 
255 A $0.20 specific for every quintillion bytes of acquired data would create a substantial 
amount of revenue. This tax would amount to approximately $180 for a year’s worth of 
each individual’s data. ($180 is found by multiplying 912.5 quintillion bytes/year by $.20. 
This is less than twenty percent of the $1,000 profit which the data generates). Applying 
this to the Unites States and assuming a population of 300 million people, over $54 billion 
dollars would be added to the yearly tax revenue. 
256 26 C.F.R. § 1.6655-4. 
257 Current per unit taxes, such as tobacco taxes, are criticized for not adjusting their flat 
rate for inflation. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE (US) COMMITTEE ON PREVENTING NICOTINE 
ADDICTION IN CHILDREN AND YOUTHS, GROWING UP TOBACCO FREE: PREVENTING 
NICOTINE ADDICTION IN CHILDREN AND YOUTHS 180 (Barbara S. Lynch & Richard J. 
Bonnie eds., 1994), available at https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK236763/ 
pdf/Bookshelf_NBK236763.pdf [https://perma.cc/CL8U-5S2N] (noting the primary 
reason for the declining revenues is the failure of the federal government to adjust cigarette 
tax rates to keep pace with inflation). 
258 Id. at 177. 
259 Taxes have been part of the federal system since the Civil War. Id. at 177–78; 
INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, ENDING THE TOBACCO PROBLEM: A BLUEPRINT FOR THE NATION, 
41–44 (The Nat’l Academies Press, 2007) https://www.nap.edu/read/11795/chapter/4 
[https://perma.cc/9RCH-68MS]. 
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the use of tobacco products.260 The current tobacco tax is $1.01 per 
pack of cigarettes, which have a national average cost of $5.51.261 
The tobacco tax has comparable goals to this data tax, and was there-
fore used as a guideline to calculate an appropriate data tax rate of 
$0.20 per quintillion bytes. 
However, this proposed tax rate is based upon data from previ-
ous years. More research must be done to accurately determine the 
amount of data companies currently collect, and what that data is 
worth, before implementing an exact amount. When calculating the 
data tax rate, the legislature should evaluate the main goals of the 
data tax. This tax is aimed to deter the over-taking of data, as well 
as (mainly) compensate the public for the constant use of their data. 
Therefore, the rate should be high enough to total a significant 
amount of data profits, but low enough to avoid an undue burden. 
This Note suggests a rate of $0.20/quintillion bytes to data collected, 
assuming that a quintillion bytes is worth approximately $1.10.262 If 
data is worth more than the estimated amount, this Note recom-
mends the rate be adjusted proportionally. Further, since technology 
is constantly changing, which constantly changes the amount of data 
taken and the value of that information, the per unit tax amount 
should be reassessed yearly. 
The data tax should only apply to large companies. If the same 
tax is imposed on all companies collecting our data—which would 
include essentially any company that wants to remain competitive—
the tax will overburden smaller companies. This would place the 
most harm on companies that are unlikely to be significantly profit-
ing from our data, while benefiting the larger companies by possibly 
eliminating their competition.263 The data tax should also apply to 
 
260 Id.  
261 FAIR REPS., supra note 139 and accompanying text; see also Kagan, supra note 139 
and accompanying text. 
262 Estimating that 912.5 quintillion bytes is worth $1000, this Note calculated that one 
quintillion bytes is worth $1.10. 
263 Smaller companies that play a lesser role in data exploitation can be the most 
negatively impacted by emerging regulations. See, e.g., Ivana Kottasova, These Companies 
Are Getting Killed by the GDPR, CNN BUS. (May 11, 2018), https://money.cnn.com/ 
2018/05/11/technology/gdpr-tech-companies-losers/index.html [https://perma.cc/5EC7-
5XFW] (“Smaller companies that do not have the same resources are struggling” to meet 
the demands of the GDPR.). Id. 
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all large companies and all data types, regardless of the business. 
The tax is not limited to tech companies because data use is not lim-
ited to tech companies. Since the tax is calculated based on the 
amount of data collected, large companies that do not collect data 
will not be affected. Similarly, this tax extends to all data types, as 
opposed to the privacy approach which only addresses personal 
data. Data suppliers create the information these companies collect 
and should be compensated for all of that data. Whether that data 
may identify the supplier is immaterial to the labor put in and is 
therefore immaterial to this tax. 
Similar to other federal per unit taxes,264 this Note recommends 
the specific data tax be collected on a quarterly basis. The U.S. 
Treasury should implement a group to collect the data tax, just as 
federal alcohol and tobacco taxes are collected by the Alcohol and 
Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau of the U.S. Treasury Department.265 
These funds are then put into a general fund or trusts to be spent in 
relation to what is taxed.266 Typically, forty percent is added to a 
general fund and sixty percent is added to the trust.267 In this case, a 
portion of the revenue in trust would fund the salaries of those who 
collect the new tax, reevaluate the tax yearly, as well as monitor data 
use to ensure compliance. The fund may also be used to create pri-
vacy initiatives. 
Individuals want to receive a benefit for the use of their data but 
are currently unable to sell it or receive payment on an individual 
basis. Although the U.S. legal landscape does not provide avenues 
to be paid directly for data, it does provide inspiration for the data 
tax solution. The three core functions of tax—the revenue, redistrib-
utive, and regulatory functions—offer the optimal solution to the 
lack of payment for data. Individuals are unable to charge compa-
nies directly for taking their data, but tax revenue would indirectly 
benefit each individual. Taxes from the collection of data would 
 
264 Specific excise taxes are collected on a quarterly basis. See Excise Tax, I.R.S. (Dec. 
1, 2020), https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/excise-tax 
[https://perma.cc/UTV2-MJPE]. 
265 See Major Federal Excise Taxes, supra note 139. 
266 An Overview of Excise Tax, I.R.S. (Oct. 7, 2020), https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/an-
overview-of-excise-tax [https://perma.cc/GXE6-DH6T]. 
267 See Major Federal Excise Taxes, supra note 139. 
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benefit everyday life by improving aspects such as community aid, 
parks, and housing. The tax would also allow money to be redistrib-
uted from companies profiting billions from the use of data back to 
the people from whom the data was generated. Lastly, and perhaps 
most influentially in the long term, the tax would regulate data col-
lection by supervising an “abuse of power.”268 
B. Benefits, Future Directions, and Possible Drawbacks 
Data generates immense value, but the public is unable to share 
in the profits that they help create. This has led to the exploitation 
of people, as well as increased wealth disparities. A tax imposed on 
large corporations on the amount of data collected would alleviate 
these harms while additionally curbing corporate tax avoidance. 
This tax would benefit individuals by contributing to the country’s 
revenue, redistributing data profits back to the people who supplied 
the information. This redistribution would compensate exploited 
data suppliers and laborers by improving their streets, parks, educa-
tion, and police, while alleviating the need for federal tax revenue. 
This tax will additionally benefit society by monitoring and regulat-
ing the use of information. 
Aiming this tax at larger companies would also help strengthen 
the revenue and redistribution functions that were hindered by tax 
expenditures. Tax expenditures mainly aid the richest corporations 
in their tax avoidance, which not only decreases large amounts of 
tax revenue that would come from the wealthiest businesses, but 
also allows a greater inequality to be created.269 A tax on large cor-
porations addresses both of these issues while also focusing on the 
biggest players causing such harm. 
One hardship of a new tax is the likelihood of subsequent ex-
emptions to the largest companies.270 This data tax is intended to 
target the exact companies that are likely to avoid it. Exemptions 
would contradict the purpose of the tax: that the wealthiest players—
 
268 44 CONG. REC. 3,344 (daily ed. June 16, 1909) (statement of President Taft). 
269 See Avi-Yonah, supra note 124, at 19. 
270 Previous tax reform bills intended to “close loopholes” were followed by the 
introduction of new tax exemptions. This Note assumes that future tax legislation will 
follow this trend. See id. at 23. 
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which are generally the companies harvesting the most data—con-
tribute to the benefit of society. If the same companies could con-
tinue to avoid this tax, it would place a greater burden on companies 
that do not qualify for exemptions. This would exacerbate the cur-
rent problems surrounding corporate competition,271 as well as hin-
der targeted funds from being redistributed to the public. In order 
for this tax to be effective, and truly benefit society, the legislature 
must anticipate these circumventions and create a tax which the larg-
est companies will not avoid. To combat the issue of further corpo-
rate tax avoidance, this Note recommends the data tax code disqual-
ifies it from exemptions or clearly enumerate the exemptions which 
may apply. Such provisions should also seek to hinder a global com-
pany’s ability to avoid taxes through foreign subsidiaries.272 
Prior to the widespread use of AI, members of society expected 
their privacy to be respected and to be paid if they were sharing their 
information. Although a tax on data collection would uphold this 
longstanding social norm, it is not a solution which will adequately 
deter the collection of data nor protect our privacy. The tax would 
simply draw revenue from the amount of data collected, but it would 
not protect citizens from the negative effects of AI inferences and 
the extreme invasions to our privacy.273 Even so, this tax, as well as 
other privacy proposals, will shift our social norms toward having 
greater concern about our data. It is hopeful that new protections to 
our privacy will be implemented as the demands for them increase. 
A further benefit may be seen if this tax was coupled with 
stronger privacy laws. While privacy laws are not the correct solu-
tion to the issue of compensation, they are a crucial solution to mis-
uses of our data. Similar to California, which has used the CPRA to 
create a new agency to regulate privacy, our government can use this 
additional revenue to create a department which aims to protect the 
privacy of its citizens. Such a group can address the exploitation of 
our personal data, monitor inferences, and allow individuals to cor-
rect false information, and perhaps be used to stop foreign 
 
271 See McCabe & Wakabayashi, supra note 222. 
272 See Johnston, supra note 145. 
273 See Wlosik, supra note 60. In one example, a data broker sold information concerning 
rape victims, alcoholics, and erectile dysfunction sufferers to advertisers. Their contact 
information was sold for $79 per list of 1,000 people. Id. 
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interferences in our information, such as during elections. This 
group would also monitor where companies are transferring this in-
formation, so that individuals have a better understanding of what 
data is collected about them. An agency can also promulgate regu-
lations that protect citizens from being targeted based upon catego-
ries such as their race, victimhood, addictions, or diseases.274 These 
regulations can also impose fines if broken, or perhaps intertwine 
with the tax law to increase the tax amount for violators. 
Over time, the combination of a tax and privacy regulations may 
lead to a greater decrease in our data collection and transfer than 
would be possible from each method individually. Funds from the 
data tax can be used to improve internet privacy, in ways such as 
countering identity theft or educating the public on internet safety, 
all of which would satisfy a relatively new public need.275 As com-
panies continue to increase the amount of data they collect, people’s 
fears also increase. Revenue collected from a tax on big data can be 
put towards data protection and awareness, benefitting society by 
calming these fears. 
A corporate tax may also lead to an eventual decrease in our in-
dividual taxes. Tax expenditures allow many large corporations to 
pay practically, if not literally, none of the 21% they are expected to 
contribute.276 This amounts to billions of dollars yearly that are not 
being contributed to our public works, which needs to be supple-
mented by individuals.277 Taxing large corporations on the amount 
of data they collect will create a large increase in tax revenue, which 
may make it feasible to lower our individual tax rate. 
In addition to decreasing our taxes, the tax may decrease the 
overall amount of data collected. Currently, large sanctions are not 
enough to deter companies from taking our personal data, so a sim-
ple tax may have no effect. However, these sanctions are imposed 
based on the size of the company, but not also the amount of data. 
A tax proportional to the amount of data may incentivize companies 
to prioritize data, instead of collecting everything and anything. This 
 
274 See id. 
275 See Madsbjerg, supra note 65. 
276 See Kranhold, supra note 147. 
277 See Sahadi, supra note 204. 
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prioritization may lead to a decrease in the amount collected. Even 
if this decrease is minimal, it is a step in the right direction. 
Imposing a corporate tax on large companies that is proportional 
to the amount of data collected will indirectly benefit each individ-
ual by directly benefitting society. This tax would aim to monitor 
how much of our data is being collected by “data monarchs.”278 This 
regulation gives individuals an understanding that their legislature 
acknowledges their data concerns, while allowing individuals to 
confer a benefit from its use. Currently, our personal information is 
being exploited, and its use is causing disparities in wealth as well 
as the loss of jobs. Citizens are calling for legislation that protects 
them and regulates the use of our data. A tax on large corporations 
for the collection of our data is a first step to answering these calls 
and would allow society to benefit from the use of their data while 
leading to improvements in how data is regulated. 
C. Comparisons to Alternative Approaches 
The rationales behind ownership and privacy approaches to data 
rights, as well as the shortfalls, have inspired this data tax solution. 
While these approaches would bring society numerous benefits, the 
tax solution is most appropriate to curb the overarching harms of 
data use. Firstly, ownership approaches are inappropriate because 
they require data property rights. For instance, Posner and Weyl 
posit that data should be treated as labor, and individuals should 
have control of their data supply. This Note agrees with the rationale 
these scholars present, but it is not feasible under our current prop-
erty laws for individuals to directly own and sell their data. Our cur-
rent intellectual property laws do not extend to factual information. 
Implementing this type of ownership solution requires the disruption 
of our basic IP laws. Conversely, a data tax solution is similar in 
rationale and approach to current per unit taxes and could be imple-
mented without changing foundational laws. 
 
278 Valentina Powell, We Don’t Want to Sell Our Data, We Want Data Rights!, PRIV. 
INT’L (Feb. 6, 2019), https://privacyinternational.org/news-analysis/2683/we-dont-want-
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Another ownership approach also aims to bring consumers com-
pensation through “dividends.”279 Andrew Yang, as well as Gover-
nor Gavin Newsom of California, called for a “digital dividend,” and 
it seems that other states are also looking to introduce similar bills 
to compensate users for their data.280 Even the Senate Banking Com-
mittee has discussed forcing platforms to pay users, but all of these 
ownership approaches are “sure to fail” because their implementa-
tion would require companies to completely change their business 
model. Additionally, there is not a set price for data to appropriate 
these dividends.281 This approach is criticized for not having the true 
ability to benefit the public, but also because it promotes “the ex-
tractive and abusive practice by tech companies.”282 If people are 
paid directly for supplying data, it incentivizes users to keep supply-
ing it. A data tax solution disincentivizes data collection, while also 
benefiting the public as a whole. 
Privacy approaches, such as implementing more comprehensive 
privacy legislation, will also fail to monetarily compensate the pub-
lic. In fact, privacy legislation may even have an opposite effect. 
Individuals use most internet services free of charge, but it’s not ex-
actly “free.”283 Individuals pay to use websites and apps with their 
data.284 If privacy regulations prohibit such data collection, provid-
ers will lose the profits they made from the data.285 This will likely 
cause companies to shift their business models; they will begin to 
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charge the public to access their websites or download their app.286 
If that is the case, individuals will be forced to pay to use the plat-
forms, and still not be paid for their data supply. 
Unlike privacy solutions—such as the CPRA, GDPR, and crim-
inal penalties for violations to privacy287—a tax does not impose 
sanctions or punishments for the use of our data. This can create a 
better relationship between the corporations, the government, and 
the individuals. Sanctions alert the public that there has been wrong-
doing and raises suspicions of corporations, but do not completely 
stop the use of our personal data or compensate society. A tax rec-
ognizes that the use of our personal data is allowed, which is prefer-
able to corporations because it does not seek to punish specific com-
panies. The tax also allows the public to receive a benefit in ways 
that sanctions do not. However, despite its differences, the tax solu-
tion incorporates the rationales of the ownership and privacy solu-
tions. Similar to the ownership solution, a tax allows the public to 
be compensated for their data, while using the principles of privacy 
law to focus on the regulation of our information. 
Although we value our privacy, we also value the benefits of 
data that have become an integral part of our everyday lives.288 This 
solution aims to allow the possibility of greater data benefits, with-
out encouraging the excessive takings and invasions to our privacy. 
A specific tax on the amount of data taken will create this balance 
of incentives. This tax tells those collecting our data that their ac-
tions are being regulated and monitored, while also telling the public 
that its use is benefitting the society we live in. 
A data tax would also bring a greater benefit than alternative tax 
increases because it addresses current social issues. Laws have the 
ability to shape and define a society’s values.289 This is seen 
throughout practically every area of the law, whether we consider 
the varying penalties for different crimes based upon what our 
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society has decided is immoral, or the protections awarded to our 
freedoms based on what our society has decided to be our funda-
mental rights. It is argued that tax scholarship is often filled with 
ineffectual incentives because it fails to consider this crucial aspect 
of the lawmaking process—social meaning.290 
Considering this social meaning, a data tax is a preferable solu-
tion to simply increasing the corporate tax. Only increasing the cor-
porate tax would incentivize companies to incorporate in other 
countries with a lower tax rate or continue to avoid the large tax 
through exemptions.291 A regular tax increase would also fail to 
compensate the public directly for their data, nor would it target 
avoided data profits. Further, a tax on the amount of data collected 
is an improved solution to a tax on the sale of data. Currently, there 
is no market price for data, and data does not have a specific 
value.292 The data’s value is based upon how companies compile the 
data, and how much others are willing to pay for it.293 The data is 
also not always “sold,” but sometimes shared with advertisers in less 
direct ways, such as when Google allows third party companies to 
connect their own tracking cookies to Google’s.294 
Additionally, a sales tax on data would not cover data that is 
collected and used to train artificial intelligence or improve a busi-
ness strategy but is not then sold to others.295 Although companies 
are still using this data to make a profit, they are not selling specific 
sets of data, and a sales tax does not apply to such transactions. This 
would allow for companies to circumvent this tax by avoiding an 
actual “sale.”296 It would also allow for larger companies, who may 
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be able to charge less for data than smaller companies, to continue 
to be taxed less. Creating a new tax on the amount of data collected 
would allow for a greater benefit to reach society because it would 
not be subject to the same avoidances as the current corporate tax. 
Further, it would bring in revenue from all of the data collected  
and used. Both an increased corporate tax and a sales tax would  
fail to truly benefit data suppliers. Therefore, while other changes to  
our tax law may increase revenue or give benefit to the public, a 
corporate tax on the amount of data collected is best suited to 
achieve this goal. 
Taxation is not only the most favorable solution from the point 
of view of the data suppliers, but also from the point of view of the 
legislature. It is not currently possible to expand our ownership 
rights to be able to transfer our private data, or to use data privacy 
regulation to receive an individual monetary benefit. However, it is 
feasible to quantify the amount of data collected and impose a tax 
on its collection as if it was any other resource. 
Opponents of a new tax may argue that an increase in corporate 
taxes would be detrimental to the economy. However, the Economic 
Policy Institute found that economic growth since the 1950s has ac-
tually been stronger when corporate tax rates were higher.297 The 
study found that lowering corporate tax rates would not spur eco-
nomic growth, nor is there any evidence that higher corporate taxes 
have a negative effect on the economy.298 Despite this evidence, the 
corporate tax rate was lowered in 2017, and further exemptions have 
allowed for an even lower effective corporate tax rate. Meanwhile, 
a lack of tax revenue has caused 1.2 million government workers to 
be furloughed since the beginning of the pandemic, as well as ex-
treme cuts to our education budget nationwide.299 Therefore, a data 
tax, which is not subject to the same corporate exemptions, is likely 
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Advances in data and technology have changed almost every as-
pect of society, but the laws have not changed with them. Our prop-
erty and privacy rights, promised by the Constitution, are being dis-
regarded when it comes to our most private information. Companies 
have begun exploiting data, using every aspect of humanity to make 
a profit. This is done without true consent, and without any compen-
sation for the data society supplies. Large companies then exploit 
laws to avoid paying taxes on the wealth data generates, placing a 
higher tax burden on the average person and increasing wealth dis-
parities. As unimaginable technologies continue to emerge, so will 
continuing harms to society. Our legislature may not always be able 
to predict these evils, but once they are so evident and egregious, it 
is their duty to act. 
